SUTTA 22

[^248]: This sutta with a fine introduction and detailed notes is available in a translation by Nyanaponika Thera, The Discourse on the Snake Simile.

[^249]: In making this assertion he directly contradicts the third of the four intrepidities of the Tathāgata - see MN 12.25. According to MA, while reflecting in seclusion he came to the conclusion that there would be no harm if bhikkhus were to engage in sexual relations with women and he maintained that this should not be prohibited by the monastic rules. Though his statement does not expressly mention the sexual issue, the similes about sensual pleasures brought forth by the bhikkhus lend credence to the commentary.

[^250]: The first seven similes for sense pleasures are expanded upon at MN 54.15-21.

[^251]: This first part of the Arittha episode occurs twice in the Vinaya Piṭaka. At Vin ii. 25 it leads to the Sangha announcing an act of suspension (ukkhepaniyakamma) against Arittha for refusing to give up his wrong view. At Vin iv.133-34 his refusal to give up his wrong view after repeated admonitions is defined as a monastic offence of the Pācittiya class.

[^252]: Though the Pali uses the one word kāma in all four cases, from the context the first phrase must be understood to refer to objective sensual pleasures, i.e., sensually enjoyable objects, the other phrases to refer to subjective defilements connected with sensuality, i.e., sensual desire. MA glosses "that one can engage in sensual pleasures" with "that one can indulge in sexual intercourse." MT says that other physical acts expressive of sexual desire such as hugging and stroking should be included.

[^253]: MA explains that this passage is stated in order to show the fault in wrongly motivated acquisition of intellectual knowledge of the Dhamma - apparently the pitfall into which Aritṭha fell. The "good (attha) for the sake of which they learned the Dhamma" is the paths and fruits.

[^254]: This famous "simile of the raft" continues the same argument against misuse of learning introduced by the simile of the snake. One who is preoccupied with using the Dhamma to stir up controversy and win debates carries the Dhamma around on his head instead of using it to cross the flood.

[^255]: Dhammā pi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā. MA identifies the good states with serenity and insight (samatha-vipassana), and paraphrases the meaning: "I teach, bhikkhus, even the abandoning of desire and attachment to such peaceful and sublime states as serenity and insight, how much more so to that low, vulgar, contemptible, coarse, and impure thing that this foolish Aritṭha sees as harmless when he says that there is no obstruction in desire and lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure." The commentator cites MN 66.26-33 as an example of the Buddha teaching the abandonment of attachment to serenity, MN 38.14 as an example of his teaching the abandonment of attachment to insight. Note that it is in each case the attachment to the good states that should be abandoned, not the good states themselves. The Buddha's injunction is not an invitation to moral nihilism or a proposal that the enlightened person has gone beyond good and evil. In this connection see MN 76.51.

[^256]: This section evidently has the purpose of forestalling another type of misconception and misrepresentation of the Dhamma, i.e., the introduction of a view of self into the teaching. According to MA, standpoints for views (diṭthiṭthāna) are wrong views themselves as grounds for other more elaborate wrong views; the objects of views, i.e., the five aggregates; and the conditions for views, i.e., such factors as ignorance, perverted perception, and false thoughts, etc.

[^257]: MA states that the notion "this is mine" is induced by craving, the notion "this I am" by conceit, and the notion "this is my self" by wrong views. These three - craving, conceit, and views - are called the three obsessions (gäha). They are also the mainsprings behind conceiving (MN 1) and mental proliferation (MN 18).

[^258]: This series of terms shows the aggregate of consciousness indirectly, by way of its object. The "seen" points to eyeconsciousness, the "heard" to ear-consciousness, the "sensed" to the other three kinds of sense consciousness, and the remaining terms to mind-consciousness.

[^259]: This is a full-fledged eternalist view arisen on the basis of one of the earlier, more rudimentary types of personality view; here it becomes itself an object of craving, conceit, and the false view of self. Ven. Nyanaponika contends that this view expresses the identity of the self with the universe, though this interpretation is purely hypothetical as the Pali is ambiguous and could just as well be pointing to a fundamental dualism of self and world along the lines of Sānkhya philosophy with its distinction between changeable Nature (prak, $t i$ ) and changeless Spirit (puru"a)

[^260]: Asati na paritassati. The noun form paritassana, according to MA, has the twofold connotation of fear and craving, thus "agitation" was chosen as comprehending both. Agitation about what is non-existent externally ( §18 ) refers to the worldling's despair over the loss or nonacquisition of possessions; agitation about what is nonexistent internally ( §20 ) to the eternalist's despair when he misinterprets the Buddha's teaching on Nibbāna as a doctrine of annihilation.

[^261]: Pariggaham pariganheyyätha, lit. "you may possess that possession." This links up with §18 on agitation about external possessions.

[^262]: Attavādupädānañ upā̄liyetha, lit. "you may cling to that clinging to a doctrine of self." On the problem this idiom involves for translation, see n.176. This passage links up with §20 on agitation arising from a view of self.

[^263]: The support of views (dithhinissaya), according to MA, is the sixty-two views mentioned in the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN 1), which emerge from personality view or "doctrine of a self." It might also include the pernicious view adopted by Arittha at the beginning of the sutta.

[^264]: The notion "what belongs to self" or "self's property" (attaniya) is ascribed to whichever among the five aggregates are not identified as self, as well as to all the individual's external possessions. This passage shows the mutual dependence, and thus the equal untenability, of the twin notions "I" and "mine."

[^265]: According to the commentaries, disenchantment (nibbida, also rendered "revulsion" or "disgust") signifies the culminating stages of insight, dispassion (virāga) the attainment of the supramundane path, and liberation (vimutti) the fruit. The arahant's reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhananana) is shown by the phrase "there comes the knowledge" and "he understands: 'Birth is destroyed...'" "

[^266]: "Thus gone" is, in Pali, tathägata, the usual epithet of the Buddha, but here applied more broadly to the arahant. MA interprets this passage in two alternative ways thus: (1) The arahant even while alive is here and now untraceable as a being or individual (in the sense of an abiding self) because in the ultimate sense there is no being (as self). (2) The arahant is untraceable here and now because it is impossible for the gods, etc., to find the support for his insight-mind, path-mind, or fruition-mind (vipassanācitta, maggacitta, phalacitta); that is, the object being Nibbāna, his mind cannot be known by the worldling.

[^267]: This refers back to §20, where the eternalist misunderstands the Buddha's teaching on Nibbāna, the cessation of being, to involve the annihilation of an existing being considered as self.

[^268]: The import of this statement is deeper than appears on the surface. In the context of the false accusations of §37, the Buddha is stating that he teaches that a living being is not a self but a mere conglomeration of factors, material and mental events, linked together in a process that is inherently dukkha, and that Nibbāna, the cessation of suffering, is not the annihilation of a being but the termination of that same unsatisfactory process. This statement should be read in conjunction with SN 12:15/ii.17, where the Buddha says that one with right view, who has discarded all doctrines of a self, sees that whatever arises is only dukkha arising, and whatever ceases is only dukkha ceasing.

[^269]: "What had earlier come to be fully understood" (pubbe pariñ̃āatam) are the five aggregates. Since it is only these to which honour and abuse are shown, not an "I" or self, there is no reason for elation or dejection.

[^270]: MA points out that it is the attachment to the five aggregates that should be abandoned; the aggregates themselves cannot be torn apart or pulled out.

[^272]: That is, as the arahants have achieved deliverance from the entire round of existence, it is impossible to point to any plane within the round where they might be reborn.

[^273]: These are two classes of individuals standing on the path of stream-entry. "Dhamma-followers" (dhammānusārin) are disciples in whom the faculty of wisdom (paññindriya) is predominant and who develop the noble path with wisdom in the lead; when they attain the fruit they are called "attained-to-view" (dithhipatta). "Faith-followers" (saddhānusārin) are disciples in whom the faculty of faith (saddhindriya) is predominant and who develop the noble path with faith in the lead; when they attain the fruit they are called "liberated-by-faith" (saddhāvimutta). See MN 70.20, 21; also Pug 1:35-36/15 and Vsm XXI, 75.

[^274]: MA says that this refers to persons devoted to the practice of insight meditation who have not reached any supramundane attainment. Note that they are headed only for heaven, not for enlightenment, though if their practice matures they can attain the path of stream-entry and thus gain assurance of enlightenment. The expression saddhāmattam pemamattam might be rendered "simply faith, simply love" or "mere faith, mere love" (as it sometimes is), but this could not explain the guarantee of rebirth in heaven. It therefore seems obligatory to take the suffix matta here as implying a requisite amount of faith and love, not simple possession of these qualities.