SUTTA 60

[^619]: MA: The Buddha began by asking this question because the village of Sālā was situated at the entrance to a forest, and many recluses and brahmins of diverse creeds would stay there overnight, expounding their own views and tearing down the views of their opponents. This left the villagers perplexed, unable to commit themselves to a particular teaching.

[^620]: Apanṇakadhamma. MA explains this as a teaching that is uncontradictable, free from ambiguity, definitely acceptable (aviraddho advejjhagāmī ekamsagāhiko). The term also occurs at AN 3:16/i.113 and AN 4:71/ii. 76.

[^621]: The three views discussed in $\S \S 5,13$ and 21 are called wrong views with fixed evil result (niyata miccha ditthi). To adhere to them with firm conviction closes off the prospect of a heavenly rebirth and the attainment of liberation. For a fuller discussion see Bodhi, Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 79-83. The examination of these views unfolds according to the following pattern: The Buddha discloses the wrong view A and its antithesis B. Taking up A for examination first, in A.i he shows the pernicious effect of this view on bodily, verbal, and mental conduct. In A.ii he proceeds from the judgement that the view is actually wrong and elicits additional negative consequences of its adoption. Then in A.iii he shows how a wise person comes to the conclusion that whether or not the view is true, it serves his best interest to reject it. Next, position B is considered. In B.i the Buddha describes the wholesome influence of this view on conduct. In B.ii he elicits additional positive consequences of adopting such a view. And in B.iii he shows how a wise person comes to the conclusion that, irrespective of its actual veracity, it serves his best interest to conduct his affairs as though the view is true.

[^622]: See n. 425 for clarification of several expressions used in the formulation of this view.

[^623]: The Pali terms are susilya and dustlya. Since "corrupt virtue" sounds self-contradictory, "conduct" has been used in my rendering of the latter expression. Nm had used "unvirtuousness."

[^624]: He has made himself safe (sotthi) in the sense that he will not be subject to suffering in a future existence. However, he is still liable to the types of suffering to be encountered in this existence, which the Buddha is about to mention.

[^625]: Natthikavāda, lit. "the doctrine of non-existence," is so called because it denies the existence of an afterlife and of kammic retribution.

[^626]: His undertaking of the incontrovertible teaching "extends only to one side" in the sense that he makes himself safe with regard to the next life only on the presupposition that there is no afterlife, while if there is an afterlife he loses on both counts.

[^627]: Atthikaväda: the affirmation of the existence of an afterlife and of kammic retribution.

[^628]: His undertaking "extends to both sides" since he reaps the benefits of his view affirming the afterlife whether or not an afterlife actually exists.

[^629]: This doctrine of non-doing (akiriyavāda), in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (DN 2.17/i.52-53), is attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa. Although on first encounter the view seems to rest on materialist premises, as the previous nihilistic view does, there is canonical evidence that Pūraṇa Kassapa subscribed to a fatalistic doctrine. Thus his moral antinomianism probably follows from the view that all action is predestined in ways that abrogate the ascription of moral responsibility to its agent. See Basham, History and Doctrines of the Äjivikas, p. 84.

[^630]: This is the doctrine of non-causality (ahetukaväda) maintained by the Äjīvaka leader Makkhali Gosāla, and called in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta the doctrine of purification by samisāra (samsārasuddhi, DN 2.21/i.54). The philosophy of Makkhali Gosāla has been examined in detail by Basham, History and Doctrines of the Äjivikas, Chapters 12 and 13. A translation of the Dīgha commentary on this doctrine will be found in Bodhi, Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 70-77.

[^631]: Niyati, destiny or fate, is the primary explanatory principle in Makkhali's philosophy, "circumstance and nature" (sangatibhäva) seem to be its modes of operation in external events and in the constitution of the individual, respectively. The six classes (abhijati) are six gradations of human beings according to their level of spiritual development, the highest being reserved for the three mentors of the Äjivakas mentioned at MN 36.5. On the six classes, see Bodhi, Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 73-75. Also, AN 6:57/iii.383-84.

[^632]: This is a denial of the four immaterial planes of existence, the objective counterparts of the four immaterial meditative attainments.

[^633]: These are the gods of the planes corresponding to the four jhānas. They possess bodies of subtle matter, unlike the gods of the immaterial planes who consist entirely of mind without any admixture of matter.

[^634]: MA: Even though the wise man discussed here has doubts about the existence of the immaterial planes, he attains the fourth jhāna, and on the basis of that he attempts to attain the immaterial absorptions. If he fails he is certain of rebirth in the fine-material planes, but if he succeeds he will be reborn in the immaterial planes. Thus for him this wager is an "incontrovertible teaching."

[^635]: MA: Cessation of being (bhavanirodha) here is Nibbāna.

[^636]: MA: Even though this person has doubts about the existence of Nibbāna, he attains the eight meditative attainments, and then, using one of those attainments as a basis, he develops insight, thinking: "If there is cessation, then I will reach arahantship and attain Nibbāna." If he fails he is certain of rebirth in the immaterial planes, but if he succeeds he reaches arahantship and attains Nibbāna.