Book 1
SOCRATES’ NARRATION BEGINS: I went down to the Piraeus yesterday
with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to say a prayer to the goddess,[^1] and also (327a) because I wanted to see how they would manage the festival, since they were holding it for the first time. I thought the procession of the local residents was beautiful, but the show put on by the Thracians was no less so, in my view. After we had said our prayer and watched the procession, we started back toward town.[^2] Then Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, saw us from a distance (b) as we were hurrying homeward, and told his slave boy to run and ask us to wait for him.The boy caught hold of my cloak[^3] from behind.
SLAVE: Polemarchus wants you to wait.
I turned around and asked where he was.
SLAVE: He is coming up behind you; please wait for him.
GLAUCON: All right, we will.
(c) Shortly after that, Polemarchus caught up with us. Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, was with him, and so were Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others, all of whom were apparently on their way from the procession.
POLEMARCHUS: It looks to me, Socrates, as if you two are hurrying to get away to town.
SOCRATES: That isn’t a bad guess.
POLEMARCHUS: But do you see how many we are?
SOCRATES: Certainly.
POLEMARCHUS: Well, then, either you must prove yourselves stronger than all these people or you will have to stay here.
SOCRATES: Isn’t there another alternative still: that we persuade you that you should let us go?
POLEMARCHUS: But could you persuade us, if we won’t listen?
GLAUCON: There is no way we could.
POLEMARCHUS: Well, we won’t listen; you had better make up your mind to that. (328a) ADEIMANTUS: You mean to say you don’t know that there is to be a torch race on horseback for the goddess tonight?
SOCRATES: On horseback? That is something new. Are they going to race on horseback and hand the torches on in relays, or what?
POLEMARCHUS: In relays. And, besides, there will be an all-night celebra- tion that will be worth seeing.We will get up after dinner and go to see the festivities.We will meet lots of young men there and have a discussion. So (b) stay and do as we ask.
GLAUCON: It looks as if we will have to stay.
SOCRATES: If you think so, we must.
So, we went to Polemarchus’ house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, and what is more,Thrasymachus of Chalcedon was there too, and Charmantides of Paeania, and Clitophon, the son of Aristonymus. Polemarchus’ father, Cephalus, was also inside, and I thought he looked quite old.You see, I hadn’t seen him for some time. He was sitting on a sort of chair with cushions and had a wreath on his head, as he had been offering a sacrifice in the courtyard.We sat down beside him,since some chairs were arranged in a circle there.As soon as he saw me, Cephalus greeted me:
Socrates, you don’t often come down to the Piraeus to see us.Yet you should. If it were still easy for me to make the trip to town, you wouldn’t have to come here. On the contrary, we would come to you. But as it is, (d) you ought to come here more often. I want you to know, you see, that in my case at least, as the other pleasures—the bodily ones—wither away, my appetites for discussions and their pleasures grow stronger.[^4] So please do as I ask: have your conversation with these young men, and stay here with us, as you would with your close friends and relatives.
SOCRATES: I certainly will, Cephalus. In fact, I enjoy engaging in discus- (e) sion with the very old. I think we should learn from them—since they are like people who have traveled a road that we too will probably have to fol- low—what the road is like, whether rough and difficult or smooth and easy. And I would be particularly glad to find out from you what you think about it, since you have reached the point in life the poets call old age’s threshold.[^5] Is it a difficult time of life? What have you to report about it?
(329a) CEPHALUS: By Zeus, Socrates, I will tell you exactly what I think. You see, a number of us who are more or less the same age often get together, so as to preserve the old saying.[^6] When they meet, the majority of our members lament, longing for the lost pleasures of their youth and reminiscing about sex, drinking parties, feasts, and the other things that go along with them.
(b) (c) (d) They get irritated, as if they had been deprived of important things, and had lived well then but are not living now. Some others, too, even moan about the abuse heaped on old people by their relatives, and for that reason recite a litany of all the evils old age has caused them. But I don’t think they blame the real cause, Socrates. After all, if that were the cause, I too would have had the same experiences, at least as far as old age is concerned, and so would everyone else of my age. But as it is, I have met others in the past who don’t feel that way—in particular, the poet Sophocles. I was once present when he was asked by someone, “How are you as far as sex goes, Sophocles? Can you still make love to a woman?”“Quiet, man,” he replied, “I am very glad to have escaped from all that, like a slave who has escaped from a deranged and savage master.” I thought at the time what he said was sensible, and I still do.You see, old age brings peace and freedom from all such things. When the appetites cease to stress and importune us, everything Sophocles said comes to pass, and we escape from many insane masters. But in these matters, and in those concerning one’s relatives, the real cause isn’t old age, Socrates, but the way people live. If they are orderly and contented, old age, too, is only moderately onerous; if they aren’t, both old age, Socrates, and youth are hard to bear.
I admired him for saying that, and I wanted him to tell me more, so I urged him on.
I imagine when you say that, Cephalus, the masses[^7] do not accept it. On (e) the contrary, they think you bear old age more easily, not because of the way you live, but because you are wealthy. For the wealthy, they say, have many consolations.
CEPHALUS: That’s true, they are not convinced. And there is something in their objection, though not as much as they think. Themistocles’ retort is relevant here. When someone from Seriphus insulted him by saying his (330a) high reputation was due to his city, not to himself, he replied that, had he been a Seriphian, he would not be famous; but nor would the other, had he been an Athenian.[^8] The same account applies to those who are not rich and find old age hard to bear: a good person would not easily bear old age if it were coupled with poverty, but one who wasn’t good would not be at peace with himself even if he were wealthy.
SOCRATES: Did you inherit most of your wealth, Cephalus, or did you make it yourself?
CEPHALUS: What did I make for myself, Socrates, you ask. As a money- (b) maker I am in between my grandfather and my father.You see, my grandfather and namesake inherited about the same amount of wealth as I possess and multiplied it many times. However, my father, Lysanias, diminished that amount to even less than I have now. As for me, I am satisfied to leave my sons here no less, but a little more, than I inherited.
SOCRATES: The reason I asked is that you do not seem particularly to love (c) money. And those who have not made it themselves are usually like that.
But those who have made it themselves love it twice as much as anyone else. For just as poets love their poems and fathers their children, so those who have made money take their money seriously both as something they have made themselves and—just as other people do—because it is useful.
This makes them difficult even to be with, since they are unwilling to praise anything except money.
CEPHALUS: That’s true.
(d) SOCRATES: Indeed, it is. But tell me something else.What do you think is the greatest good you have enjoyed as a result of being very wealthy?
(e) CEPHALUS: What I have to say probably would not persuade the masses. But you are well aware, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he did not fear before. It is then that the stories told about Hades, that a person who has been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of— twist his soul this way and that for fear they are true. And whether because of the weakness of old age, or because he is now closer to what happens in Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with fore- boding and fear, and begins to calculate and consider whether he has been unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he often even awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of evils to come. But someone who knows he has not been unjust has sweet good hope as his constant companion—a nurse to his old age, as Pindar says. For he puts it charmingly, Socrates, when he says that when someone lives a just and pious life,
(331a)
Sweet hope is in his heart
Nurse and companion to his age
Hope, captain of the ever-twisting
Mind of mortal men.
(b) How amazingly well he puts that. It is in this connection I would say the possession of wealth is most valuable, not for every man, but for a good and orderly one. Not cheating someone even unintentionally, not lying to him, not owing a sacrifice to some god or money to a person, and as a result departing for that other place in fear—the possession of wealth makes no small contribution to this. It has many other uses, too, but putting one thing against the other, Socrates, I would say that for a man with any sense, that is how wealth is most useful.
(c) SOCRATES: A fine sentiment, Cephalus. But speaking of that thing itself, justice,[^9] are we to say it is simply speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred? Or is it sometimes just to do these things, sometimes unjust? I mean this sort of thing, for example: everyone would surely agree that if a man borrows weapons from a sane friend, and if he goes mad and asks for them back, the friend should not return them, and would not be just if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone in such a state.
(d) CEPHALUS: That’s true.
SOCRATES: Then the following is not the definition of justice: to speak the truth and repay what one has borrowed.
Polemarchus interrupted:
It certainly is, Socrates, if indeed we are to trust Simonides at all.
CEPHALUS: Well, then, I will hand over the discussion to you, since it is time for me to look after the sacrifices.
POLEMARCHUS: Am I, Polemarchus, not heir of all your possessions?
Cephalus replied with a laugh:
Certainly.
And off he went to the sacrifice.
(e) SOCRATES: Then tell us, heir to the discussion, just what Simonides said about justice that you think is correct.
POLEMARCHUS: He said it is just to give to each what is owed to him. And a fine saying it is, in my view.
(332a) SOCRATES: Well, now, it is not easy to disagree with Simonides, since he is a wise and godlike man. But what exactly does he mean? Perhaps you know, Polemarchus, but I do not understand. Clearly, he does not mean what we said a moment ago—namely, giving back to someone whatever he has lent to you, even if he is out of his mind when he asks for it. And yet what he has lent to you is surely something that is owed to him, isn’t it?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But when he is out of his mind, it is, under no circumstances, to be given to him?
POLEMARCHUS: True.
SOCRATES: Then it seems Simonides must have meant something else when he says that to return what is owed is just.
POLEMARCHUS: Something else indeed, by Zeus! He meant friends owe something good to their friends, never something bad.
SOCRATES: I understand. You mean someone does not give a lender what he is owed by giving him gold, when the giving and taking would be (b) harmful, and both he and the lender are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides meant?
POLEMARCHUS: It certainly is.
SOCRATES: Now what about this? Should one also give to one’s enemies whatever is owed to them?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes, by all means.What is in fact owed to them. And what an enemy owes an enemy, in my view, is also precisely what is appropri- ate—something bad.
(c) SOCRATES: It seems, then, Simonides was speaking in riddles—just like a poet!—when he said what justice is. For what he meant, it seems, is that it is just to give to each what is appropriate to him, and this is what he called giving him what he is owed.
POLEMARCHUS: What else did you think he meant?
SOCRATES: Then what, in the name of Zeus, do you think he would answer if someone asked him:“Simonides, what owed or appropriate things does the craft[^10] we call medicine give, and to which things?”
POLEMARCHUS: Clearly, he would say it gives drugs, food, and drink to bodies.
SOCRATES: And what owed or appropriate things does the craft we call cooking give, and to which things?
(d) POLEMARCHUS: It gives pleasant flavors to food.
SOCRATES: Good. Now what does the craft we would call justice give, and to whom or what does it give it?
POLEMARCHUS: If we are to follow the previous answers, Socrates, it gives benefit to friends and harm to enemies.
SOCRATES: Does Simonides mean, then, that treating friends well and enemies badly is justice?
POLEMARCHUS: I believe so.
SOCRATES: And who is most capable of treating sick friends well and ene- mies badly in matters of disease and health?
POLEMARCHUS: A doctor.
(e) SOCRATES: And who can do so best in a storm at sea?
POLEMARCHUS: A ship’s captain.[^11]
SOCRATES: What about the just person? In what actions and what work is he most capable of benefiting friends and harming enemies?
POLEMARCHUS: In wars and alliances, I imagine.
SOCRATES: All right. Now when people are not sick, Polemarchus, a doc- tor is useless to them.
POLEMARCHUS: True.
SOCRATES: And so is a ship’s captain to those who are not sailing?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So to people who are not at war, a just man is useless?
POLEMARCHUS: No, I don’t think that at all.
SOCRATES: So justice is also useful in peacetime? (333a) POLEMARCHUS: Yes, it is useful.
SOCRATES: And so is farming, isn’t it?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: For providing produce?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And shoemaking as well, of course?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: For the acquisition of shoes, I suppose you would say?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what is justice useful for using or acquiring in peacetime?
POLEMARCHUS: Contracts, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And by contracts you mean partnerships, or what?
POLEMARCHUS: Partnerships, of course. (b) SOCRATES: So is it a just man who is a good and useful partner in a game of checkers, or an expert checkers player?
POLEMARCHUS: An expert checkers player.
SOCRATES: And in laying bricks and stones, is a just person a better and more useful partner than a builder?
POLEMARCHUS: Not at all.
SOCRATES: Well, in what kind of partnership, then, is a just person a bet- ter partner than a builder or a lyre player, in the way a lyre player is better than a just person at hitting the right notes?
POLEMARCHUS: In money matters, I think.
SOCRATES: Except, I presume, Polemarchus, in using money.You see, whenever one needs to buy or sell a horse jointly, I think a horse breeder is (c) a more useful partner. Isn’t he?
POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: And when it is a boat, a boat builder or a ship’s captain?
POLEMARCHUS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: In what joint use of silver or gold, then, is a just person a more useful partner than anyone else?
POLEMARCHUS: When yours must be deposited for safekeeping, Socrates.
SOCRATES: You mean whenever there is no need to use it, but only to keep it?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
(d) SOCRATES: So when money is not being used, that is when justice is useful for it?
POLEMARCHUS: It looks that way.
SOCRATES: And when one needs to keep a pruning knife safe, justice is useful both in partnerships and for the individual.When you need to use it, however, it is the craft of vine pruning that is useful?
POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: And would you also say that when one needs to keep a shield and a lyre safe and not use them, justice is a useful thing, but when you need to use them it is the soldier’s craft or the musician’s that is useful?
POLEMARCHUS: I would have to.
SOCRATES: And so in all other cases, too, justice is useless when they are in use, but useful when they are not?
POLEMARCHUS: It looks that way.
(e) SOCRATES: Then justice cannot be something excellent, can it, my friend, if it is only useful for useless things. But let’s consider the following point.
Isn’t the person who is cleverest at landing a blow, whether in boxing or any other kind of fight, also cleverest at guarding against it?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: And the one who is clever at guarding against disease is also cleverest at producing it unnoticed?
POLEMARCHUS: That is my view, at any rate.
(334a) SOCRATES: And the one who is a good guardian of an army is the very one who can steal the enemy’s plans and dispositions?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: So whenever someone is a clever guardian of something, he is also clever at stealing it.
POLEMARCHUS: It seems so.
SOCRATES: So if a just person is clever at guarding money, he must also be clever at stealing it.
POLEMARCHUS: So the argument suggests, at least.
SOCRATES: It seems, then, that a just person has turned out to be a kind of thief.You probably got that idea from Homer. For he loves Autolycus, the (b) maternal grandfather of Odysseus, whom he describes as better than everyone at stealing and swearing false oaths.[^12] According to you, Homer, and Simonides, then, justice seems to be some sort of craft of stealing—one that benefits friends and harms enemies. Isn’t that what you meant?
POLEMARCHUS: No, by Zeus, it isn’t. But I do not know anymore what I meant. I still believe this, however, that benefiting one’s friends and harm- ing one’s enemies is justice.
(c) SOCRATES: Speaking of friends, do you mean those a person believes to be good and useful, or those who actually are good and useful, even if he does not believe they are, and similarly with enemies?
POLEMARCHUS: Probably, one loves those one considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad.
SOCRATES: But don’t people make mistakes about this, so that lots of those who seem to them to be good and useful aren’t, and vice versa?
POLEMARCHUS: They do.
SOCRATES: So, for them, good people are enemies and bad ones friends?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: All the same, it is then just for them to benefit bad people and (d) harm good ones?
POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Yet good people are just and are not the sort to do injustice.
POLEMARCHUS: True.
SOCRATES: According to your account, then, it is just to do bad things to those who do no injustice.
POLEMARCHUS: Not at all, Socrates. It is my account that seems to be bad.
SOCRATES: It is just, then, is it, to harm unjust people and benefit just ones?
POLEMARCHUS: That seems better than the other view.
(e) SOCRATES: Then it follows, Polemarchus, that it is just for many people— the ones who are mistaken in their judgment—to harm their friends, since they are bad for them, and benefit their enemies, since they are good. And so we will find ourselves claiming the very opposite of what we said Simo- nides meant.
POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that certainly follows. But let’s change our definition. For it looks as though we did not define friends and enemies correctly.
SOCRATES: How did we define them, Polemarchus?
POLEMARCHUS: We said that a friend is someone who is believed to be good.
SOCRATES: And how are we to change that now?
(335a) POLEMARCHUS: Someone who is both believed to be good and is good is a friend; someone who is believed to be good, but is not, is believed to be a friend but is not. And the same goes for enemies.
SOCRATES: According to that account, then, a good person will be friend and a bad one an enemy.
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So you want us to add something to what we said before about the just man. Then we said that it is just to treat friends well and enemies badly. Now you want us to add to this: to treat a friend well, provided he is good, and to harm an enemy, provided he is bad?
(b) POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that seems well put to me.
SOCRATES: Should a just man really harm anyone whatsoever?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course. He should harm those who are both bad and enemies.
SOCRATES: When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?
POLEMARCHUS: Worse.
SOCRATES: With respect to the virtue[^13] that makes dogs good, or to the one that makes horses good?
POLEMARCHUS: With respect to the one that makes horses good.
SOCRATES: And when dogs are harmed, they become worse with respect to the virtue that makes dogs, not horses, good?
POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily.
(c) SOCRATES: And what about human beings, comrade; shouldn’t we say that, when they are harmed, they become worse with respect to human virtue?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: But isn’t justice human virtue?
POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that’s necessarily so, too.
SOCRATES: Then, my dear Polemarchus, people who have been harmed are bound to become more unjust.
POLEMARCHUS: So it seems.
SOCRATES: Now, can musicians use music to make people unmusical?
POLEMARCHUS: No, they can’t.
SOCRATES: Or can horsemen use horsemanship to make people unhorse- manlike?
POLEMARCHUS: No.
(d) SOCRATES: Well, then, can just people use justice to make people unjust? In a word, can good people use their virtue or goodness to make people bad?
POLEMARCHUS: No, they can’t.
SOCRATES: For it isn’t the function of heat to cool things down, I imagine, but that of its opposite.
POLEMARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor the function of dryness to make things wet, but that of its opposite.
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: So the function of a good person isn’t to harm, but that of his opposite.
POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: And a just person is a good person?
POLEMARCHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: So it isn’t the function of a just person to harm a friend or anyone else, Polemarchus, but that of his opposite, an unjust person.
POLEMARCHUS: I think you are absolutely right, Socrates. (e) SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and bene- fit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone.
POLEMARCHUS: I agree.
SOCRATES: You and I will fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this.
POLEMARCHUS: I, for my part, am willing to be your partner in the battle.
(336a) SOCRATES: Do you know whose saying I think it is, that it is just to bene- fit friends and harm enemies?
POLEMARCHUS: Whose?
SOCRATES: I think it is a saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias of Thebes, or some other wealthy man who thought he had great power.
POLEMARCHUS: That’s absolutely true.
SOCRATES: All right. Since it has become apparent, then, that neither jus- tice nor the just consists in benefiting friends and harming enemies, what else should one say it is?
(b) Now, while we were speaking,Thrasymachus had tried many times to take over the discussion but was restrained by those sitting near him, who wanted to hear our argument to the end.When we paused after what I had just said, however, he could not keep quiet any longer: crouched up like a wild beast about to spring, he hurled himself at us as if to tear us to pieces. Polemarchus and I were frightened and flustered as he roared into our midst:
(c) What nonsense you two have been talking all this time, Socrates! Why do you act like naïve people, giving way to one another? If you really want to know what justice is, don’t just ask questions and then indulge your love of honor by refuting the answers.You know very well it is easier to ask ques- tions than to answer them. Give an answer yourself and tell us what you say (d) the just is. And don’t tell me it is the right, the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly what you mean. For I won’t accept such nonsense from you.
His words startled me and, looking at him, I was afraid. And I think if I had not seen him before he looked at me, I would have been dumbstruck.[^14] But as it was, I happened to look at him just as he began to be exasperated by our argument, so I was able to answer; and trembling a little, I said:
(337a) Do not be too hard on us, Thrasymachus. If Polemarchus and I made an error in our investigation of the accounts, you may be sure we did so invol- untarily. If we were searching for gold, we would never voluntarily give way to each other, if by doing so we would destroy our chance of finding it. So do not think that in searching for justice, a thing more honorable than a large quantity of gold, we would foolishly give way to one another or be less than completely serious about finding it.You surely must not think that, my friend, but rather—as I do—that we are incapable of finding it. Hence it is surely far more appropriate for us to be pitied by you clever people than to be given rough treatment.
When he heard that, he gave a loud sarcastic laugh:
By Heracles! That is Socrates’ usual irony[^15] for you! I knew this would happen. I even told these others earlier that you would be unwilling to answer, that you would be ironic and do anything rather than give an answer, if someone questioned you.
(b) SOCRATES: That is because you are a wise fellow, Thrasymachus.You knew very well if you ask someone how much twelve is, and in putting the question you warn him, “Don’t tell me, man, that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three; for I won’t accept such nonsense from you”—it was obvious to you, I imagine, that no one could respond to a person who inquired in that way. But suppose he said to you: “What do you mean, Thrasymachus; am I not to give any of the answers you mention, not even if twelve happens to be one of those things? You are amazing. Do you want me to say something other than the truth? (c) Or do you mean something else?”What answer would you give him?
THRASYMACHUS: Well, so you think the two cases are alike?
SOCRATES: Why shouldn’t I? But even if they are not alike, yet seem so to the person you asked, do you think he is any less likely to give the answer that seems right to him, whether we forbid him to do so or not?
THRASYMACHUS: Is that what you are going to do, give one of the forbidden answers?
SOCRATES: I would not be surprised—provided it is the one that seems right to me after I have investigated the matter.
(d) THRASYMACHUS: What if I show you another answer about justice, one that is different from all these and better than any of them? What penalty would you deserve then?
SOCRATES: The very one that is appropriate for someone who does not know—what else? And what is appropriate is to learn from the one who does know.That, therefore, is what I deserve to suffer.
THRASYMACHUS: What a pleasant fellow you are! But in addition to learning, you must pay money.
SOCRATES: I will if I ever have any.
GLAUCON: He has it already. If it is a matter of money, speak, Thrasyma- chus.We will all contribute for Socrates.
(e) THRASYMACHUS: Oh yes, sure, so that Socrates can carry on as usual: he gives no answer himself, and if someone else does, he takes up his account and refutes it.
SOCRATES: How can someone give an answer, my excellent man, when, first of all, he does not know and does not claim to know, and then, even if he does have some opinion about the matter, is forbidden by no ordinary man to express any of the things he thinks? No, it is much more appropri- (338a) ate for you to answer, since you say you do know and can tell us. Don’t be obstinate. Give your answer as a favor to me and do not begrudge your teaching to Glaucon and the others.
While I was saying this, Glaucon and the others begged him to do as I asked. Thrasymachus clearly wanted to speak in order to win a good reputation, since he thought he had a very good answer. But he pretended to want to win a victory at my expense by having me do the answering. However, he agreed in the end, and then said:
(b) That is Socrates’ wisdom for you: he himself isn’t willing to teach but goes around learning from others and isn’t even grateful to them.
SOCRATES: When you say I learn from others, you are right, Thrasymachus; but when you say I do not give thanks, you are wrong. I give as much as I can. But I can give only praise, since I have no money. And just how enthusiastically I give it, when someone seems to me to speak well, you will know as soon as you have answered, since I think you will speak well.
(c) THRASYMACHUS: Listen, then. I say justice is nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger. Well, why don’t you praise me? No, you are unwilling.
(d) SOCRATES: First, I must understand what you mean. For, as things stand, I do not. What is advantageous for the stronger, you say, is just. What on earth do you mean,Thrasymachus? Surely you do not mean something like this: Polydamas, the pancratist,[^16] is stronger than we are. Beef is advanta- geous for his body. So, this food is also both advantageous and just for us who are weaker than he?
THRASYMACHUS: You disgust me, Socrates.You interpret my account in the way that does it the most evil.
SOCRATES: That’s not it at all, my very good man; I only want you to make your meaning clearer.
THRASYMACHUS: Don’t you know, then, that some cities are ruled by a tyranny, some by a democracy, and some by an aristocracy?
SOCRATES: Of course I do.
THRASYMACHUS: And that what is stronger in each city is the ruling element?
SOCRATES: Certainly.
(e) THRASYMACHUS: And each type of rule makes laws that are advantageous for itself: democracy makes democratic ones, tyranny tyrannical ones, and so on with the others. And by so legislating, each declares that what is just for its subjects is what is advantageous for itself—the ruler—and it punishes anyone who deviates from this as lawless and unjust.That, Socrates, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities: what is advantageous for the established rule. (339a) Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who does the rational calculation correctly will conclude that the just is the same every- where—what is advantageous for the stronger.
SOCRATES: Now I see what you mean.Whether it is true or not, I will try to find out. But you yourself have answered that what is just is what is advantageous,Thrasymachus, whereas you forbade me to answer that.True, you have added for the stronger to it.
(b) THRASYMACHUS: And I suppose you think that is an insignificant addition.
SOCRATES: It isn’t clear yet whether it is significant. What is clear is that we must investigate whether or not it is true. I agree that what is just is something advantageous. But you add for the stronger. I do not know about that.We will have to look into it.
THRASYMACHUS: Go ahead and look.
SOCRATES: That is just what I am going to do. Tell me, then, you also claim, don’t you, that it is just to obey the rulers?
THRASYMACHUS: I do.
(c) SOCRATES: And are the rulers in each city infallible, or are they liable to error?
THRASYMACHUS: No doubt, they are liable to error.
SOCRATES: So, when they attempt to make laws, they make some cor- rectly, others incorrectly?
THRASYMACHUS: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: And a law is correct if it prescribes what is advantageous for the rulers themselves, and incorrect if it prescribes what is disadvantageous for them? Is that what you mean?
THRASYMACHUS: It is.
SOCRATES: And whatever laws the rulers make must be obeyed by their subjects, and that is what is just?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
(d) SOCRATES: According to your account, then, it isn’t only just to do what is advantageous for the stronger, but also the opposite: what is not advanta- geous.
THRASYMACHUS: What is that you are saying?
SOCRATES: The same as you, I think. But let’s examine it more closely.
Haven’t we agreed that the rulers are sometimes in error as to what is best for themselves when they give orders to their subjects, and yet that it is just for their subjects to do whatever their rulers order? Wasn’t that agreed?
THRASYMACHUS: I suppose so.
(e) SOCRATES: You will also have to suppose, then, that you have agreed that it is just to do what is disadvantageous for the rulers and those who are stronger, whenever they unintentionally order what is bad for themselves.
But you say, too, that it is just for the others to obey the orders the rulers gave.You are very wise,Thrasymachus, but doesn’t it necessarily follow that it is just to do the opposite of what you said, since the weaker are then ordered to do what is disadvantageous for the stronger?
(340a) POLEMARCHUS: By Zeus, Socrates, that’s absolutely clear.
And Clitophon interrupted:
Of course it is, if you are to be his witness, at any rate.
POLEMARCHUS: Who needs a witness? Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers sometimes issue orders that are bad for them, and that it is just for the others to obey them.
CLITOPHON: That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus maintained that it is just to obey the orders of the rulers.
(b) POLEMARCHUS: Yes, Clitophon, and he also maintained that what is advantageous for the stronger is just. And having maintained both princi- ples, he went on to agree that the stronger sometimes order the weaker, who are subject to them, to do things that are disadvantageous for the stronger themselves. From these agreements it follows that what is advanta- geous for the stronger is no more just than what is not advantageous.
CLITOPHON: But what he meant by what is advantageous for the stronger is what the stronger believes to be advantageous for him.That is what he main- tained the weaker must do, and that is what he maintained is what is just.
POLEMARCHUS: But it is not what he said.
(c) SOCRATES: It makes no difference, Polemarchus. If Thrasymachus wants to put it that way now, let’s accept it. But tell me, Thrasymachus, is that what you intended to say, that what is just is what the stronger believes to be advantageous for him, whether it is in fact advantageous for him or not?
Is that what we are to say you mean?
THRASYMACHUS: Not at all. Do you think I would call someone who is in error stronger at the very moment he errs?
SOCRATES: I did think you meant that, when you agreed that the rulers are not infallible but sometimes make errors.
(d) THRASYMACHUS: That is because you are a quibbler in arguments, Socrates. I mean, when someone makes an error in the treatment of patients, do you call him a doctor in virtue of the fact that he made that very error? Or, when someone makes an error in calculating, do you call him an accountant in virtue of the fact that he made that very error in cal- culation? I think we express ourselves in words that, taken literally, do say that a doctor is in error, or an accountant, or a grammarian. But each of (e) these, to the extent that he is what we call him, never makes errors, so that, according to the precise account (and you are a stickler for precise accounts), no craftsman ever makes errors. It is when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and, in virtue of the fact that he made that error, he is no craftsman. No craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling, even though everyone will say that a physician or a ruler makes errors. It is in this loose way that you must also take the answer I gave just now. But the most precise answer is this: a ruler,
(341a) to the extent that he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and that is what his subject must do.Thus, as I said from the first, it is just to do what is advantageous for the stronger.
SOCRATES: Well,Thrasymachus, so you think I quibble, do you?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And you think that I asked the questions I did in a premedi- tated attempt to do you evil in the argument?
THRASYMACHUS: I am certain of it. But it won’t do you any good.You (b) will never be able to do me evil by covert means, and without them, you will never be able to overpower me by argument.
SOCRATES: Bless you,Thrasymachus; I would not so much as try! But to prevent this sort of confusion from happening to us again, would you define whether you mean the ruler and stronger in the ordinary sense or in what you were just now calling the precise sense, when you say that it is just for the weaker to do what is advantageous for him, since he is the stronger?
THRASYMACHUS: I mean the ruler in the most precise sense. Now do that evil, if you can, and practice your quibbling on it—I ask no favors. But you will find there is nothing you can do.
SOCRATES: Do you think that I am crazy enough to try to shave a lion[^17] (c) and quibble with Thrasymachus?
THRASYMACHUS: Well, you certainly tried just now, although you were a good-for-nothing at it, too!
SOCRATES: That’s enough of that! Tell me: is a doctor—in the precise sense, the one you mentioned before—a moneymaker or someone who treats the sick? Tell me about the one who is really a doctor.
THRASYMACHUS: Someone who treats the sick.
SOCRATES: What about a ship’s captain? Is the true captain a ruler of sailors, or a sailor?
THRASYMACHUS: A ruler of sailors.
SOCRATES: In other words, we should not take any account of the fact (d) that he sails in a ship, and he should not be called a sailor for that reason.
For it is not because he is sailing that he is called a ship’s captain, but because of the craft he practices and his rule over sailors?
THRASYMACHUS: True.
SOCRATES: And is there something that is advantageous for each of these?[^18]
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And isn’t it also the case that the natural aim of the craft is to consider and provide what is advantageous for each?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, that is its aim.
SOCRATES: And is anything advantageous for each of the crafts themselves besides being as perfect as possible? (e) THRASYMACHUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: It is like this: suppose you asked me whether it is satisfactory for a body to be a body, or whether it needs something else. I would answer, “Of course it needs something. In fact, that is why the craft of medicine has been discovered—because a body is deficient and it is not sat- isfactory for it to be like that.[^19] To provide what is advantageous, that is what the craft was developed for.” Do you think I am speaking correctly in saying this, or not?
THRASYMACHUS: Correctly.
SOCRATES: What about medicine itself? Is it deficient? Does a craft need (342a) some further virtue, as the eyes are in need of sight and the ears of hearing, so that another craft is needed to consider and provide what is advantageous for them?[^20] Does a craft have some similar deficiency itself, so that each craft needs another to consider what is advantageous for it? And does the craft that does the considering need still another, and so on without end?
Or does each consider by itself what is advantageous for it? Does it need (b) neither itself nor another craft to consider what—in light of its own defi- ciency—is advantageous for it? Indeed, is there no deficiency or error in any craft? And is it inappropriate for any craft to consider what is advanta- geous for anything besides that with which it deals? And since it is itself correct, is it without fault or impurity so long as it is wholly and precisely the craft it is? Consider this with that precision of language you mentioned.
Is it so or not?
THRASYMACHUS: It appears to be so.
SOCRATES: Doesn’t it follow that medicine does not consider what is (c) advantageous for medicine, but for the body?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And horse breeding does not consider what is advantageous for horse breeding, but for horses? Indeed, no other craft considers what is advantageous for itself—since it has no further needs—but what is advanta- geous for that with which it deals?
THRASYMACHUS: Apparently so.
SOCRATES: Now surely,Thrasymachus, the various crafts rule over and are stronger than that with which they deal?
He gave in at this point as well, very reluctantly.
SOCRATES: So no kind of knowledge considers or enjoins what is advan- tageous for itself, but what is advantageous for the weaker, which is subject (d) to it.
He finally agreed to this too, although he tried to fight it. When he had agreed, however, I said:
Surely then, no doctor, to the extent that he is a doctor, considers or enjoins what is advantageous for himself, but what is advantageous for his patient? For we agreed that a doctor, in the precise sense, is a ruler of bod- ies, not a moneymaker. Isn’t that what we agreed?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So a ship’s captain, in the precise sense, is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?
(e) THRASYMACHUS: That is what we agreed.
SOCRATES: Doesn’t it follow that a ship’s captain and ruler won’t consider and enjoin what is advantageous for a captain, but what is advantageous for a sailor and his subject?
He reluctantly agreed. SOCRATES: So then,Thrasymachus, no one in any position of rule, to the extent that he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is advantageous for him- self, but what is advantageous for his subject—that on which he practices his craft. It is to his subject and what is advantageous and proper for it that he looks, and everything he says and does, he says and does for it.
(343a) When we reached this point in the argument and it was clear to all that his account of justice had turned into its opposite, instead of answering,Thrasymachus said:
Tell me, Socrates, do you still have a wet nurse?
SOCRATES: What is that? Shouldn’t you be giving answers rather than ask- ing such things?
THRASYMACHUS: Because she is letting you run around sniveling and doesn’t wipe your nose when you need it, since it is her fault that you do not know the difference between sheep and shepherds.
SOCRATES: What exactly is it I do not know? (b) THRASYMACHUS: You think that shepherds and cowherds consider what is good for their sheep and cattle, and fatten them and take care of them with some aim in mind other than what is good for their master and themselves.
Moreover, you believe that rulers in cities—true rulers, that is—think about their subjects in a different way than one does about sheep, and that what they consider night and day is something other than what is advanta- (c) geous for themselves.You are so far from understanding justice and what is just, and injustice and what is unjust, that you do not realize that justice is really the good of another, what is advantageous for the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the oppo- site, it rules those simpleminded—for that is what they really are—just peo- ple, and the ones it rules do what is advantageous for the other who is stronger; and they make the one they serve happy, but they do not make themselves the least bit happy.
(d) You must consider it as follows, Socrates, or you will be the most naïve of all: a just man must always get less than does an unjust one. First, in their contracts with one another, when a just man is partner to an unjust, you will never find, when the partnership ends, that the just one gets more than the unjust, but less. Second, in matters relating to the city, when taxes are to be paid, a just man pays more on an equal amount of property, an unjust one less; but when the city is giving out refunds, a just man gets nothing while an unjust one makes a large profit. Finally, when (e) each of them holds political office, a just person—even if he is not penal- ized in other ways—finds that his private affairs deteriorate more because he has to neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse because of his justice, and that he is hated by his relatives and acquaintan- ces because he is unwilling to do them an unjust favor. The opposite is true of an unjust man in every respect. I mean, of course, the person I described before: the man of great power who does better[^21] than everyone (344a) else. He is the one you should consider if you want to figure out how much more advantageous it is for the individual to be unjust than just.You will understand this most easily if you turn your thoughts to injustice of the most complete sort, the sort that makes those who do injustice happi- est, and those who suffer it—those who are unwilling to do injustice— most wretched. The sort I mean is tyranny, because it uses both covert means and force to appropriate the property of others—whether it is sacred or secular, public or private—not little by little, but all at once. If (b) someone commits a part of this sort of injustice and gets caught, he is punished and greatly reproached—temple robbers,[^22] kidnappers, house- breakers, robbers, and thieves are what these partly unjust people are called when they commit those harms. When someone appropriates the possessions of the citizens, on the other hand, and then kidnaps and enslaves the possessors as well, instead of these shameful names he is called (c) happy and blessed: not only by the citizens themselves, but even by all who learn that he has committed the whole of injustice. For it is not the fear of doing injustice, but of suffering it, that elicits the reproaches of those who revile injustice.
So you see, Socrates, injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterful than justice. And, as I said from the beginning, justice is what is advantageous for the stronger, while injustice is profitable and advantageous for oneself.
(d) Having, like a bath attendant, emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once, Thrasymachus was thinking of leaving. But those present wouldn’t let him. They made him stay and give an account of what he had said. And I myself was particularly insistent:
You are marvelous, Thrasymachus; after hurling such a speech at us, you surely cannot be thinking of leaving before you have adequately instructed us—or learned yourself—whether you are right or not. Or do you think it (e) is a trivial matter you are trying to determine, and not rather a way of life—the one that would make living life that way most profitable for each of us?
THRASYMACHUS: Do you mean that I do not think it is a serious matter?
SOCRATES: Either that, or you care nothing for us and so are not worried about whether we will live better or worse lives because of our ignorance of what you claim to know. No, be a good fellow and show some willing- ness to teach us—you won’t do badly for yourself if you help a group as (345a) large as ours. For my own part, I will tell you that I am not persuaded. I do not believe that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if you should give it full scope to do what it wants. Suppose, my good fellow, that there is an unjust person, and suppose he does have the power to do injus- tice, whether by covert means or open warfare; nonetheless, he does not persuade me that injustice is more profitable than justice. Perhaps someone (b) here besides myself feels the same as I do. So, blessed though you are, you are going to have to fully persuade us that we are wrong to value justice more highly than injustice in deliberating.
THRASYMACHUS: And how am I to persuade you? If you are not per- suaded by what I said just now, what more can I do? Am I to take my argu- ment and pour it into your very soul?
(c) (d) (e) SOCRATES: No, by Zeus, do not do that! But first, stick to what you have said, or, if you change your position, do it openly and do not try to deceive us. You see, Thrasymachus, having defined the true doctor—to continue examining the things you said before—you did not consider it necessary to maintain the same level of exactness when you later turned to the true shepherd. You do not think a shepherd—to the extent that he is a shep- herd—fattens sheep with the aim of doing what is best for them. But you think that, like a guest about to be entertained at a feast, his aim is to eat well or to make a future sale—as if he were a moneymaker rather than a shepherd. But of course, the only concern of the craft of shepherding is to provide what is best for that with which it deals, since it itself is adequately provided with all it needs to be at its best, as we know, when it does not fall short in any way of being the craft of shepherding. That is why I, at any rate, thought it necessary for us to agree before[^23] that every kind of rule— to the extent that it is a kind of rule—does not seek anything other than what is best for the thing it rules and cares for, and this is true both in polit- ical and in private rule. But do you think that those who rule cities—the ones who are truly rulers—rule willingly?
THRASYMACHUS: I do not think it, by Zeus, I know it.
SOCRATES: But, Thrasymachus, don’t you realize that in other kinds of rule there is no willing ruler? On the contrary, they demand to be paid on the assumption that their ruling will benefit not themselves, but their sub- (346a) jects. For tell me, don’t we say that each craft differs from every other in what it is capable of doing? Blessed though you are, please don’t answer contrary to your belief, so that we can come to some definite conclusion.
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, that is what differentiates them.
SOCRATES: And doesn’t each craft provide us with a particular benefit, dif- ferent from the others? For example, medicine provides us with health, captaincy with safety at sea, and so on with the others?
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And doesn’t wage-earning provide us with wages, since that is (b) what it is capable of doing? Or would you call medicine the same craft as captaincy? Indeed, if you want to define matters precisely, as you proposed, even if someone who is a ship’s captain becomes healthy because what is advantageous for him is sailing on the sea, you would not for that reason call what he does medicine, would you?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Nor would you call wage-earning medicine, even if someone becomes healthy while earning wages?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Nor would you call medicine wage-earning, even if someone earns pay while healing?
(c) THRASYMACHUS: No.
SOCRATES: We are agreed then, aren’t we, that each craft brings its own special benefit?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, we are.
SOCRATES: So whatever benefit all craftsmen jointly receive must clearly derive from their joint practice of some additional craft that is the same for each of them.
THRASYMACHUS: It seems so.
SOCRATES: And we say that the additional craft in question, which bene- fits the craftsmen by earning them wages, is the craft of wage-earning?
He reluctantly agreed.
(d) SOCRATES: Then this very benefit, receiving wages, is not provided to each of them by his own craft. On the contrary, if we are to examine the matter precisely, medicine provides health and wage-earning provides a wage; house-building provides a house, and wage-earning, which accom- panies it, provides a wage; and so on with the other crafts. Each of them does its own work and benefits that with which it deals. So, wages aside, is there any benefit that craftsmen get from their craft?
THRASYMACHUS: Apparently not.
SOCRATES: But he still provides a benefit, even when he works for (e) nothing?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, I think he does.
SOCRATES: Then, it is clear now, Thrasymachus, that no type of craft or rule provides what is beneficial for itself; but, as we have been saying for some time, it provides and enjoins what is beneficial for its subject, and aims at what is advantageous for it—the weaker, not the stronger. That is why I said just now, my dear Thrasymachus, that no one chooses to rule voluntarily and take other people’s troubles in hand and straighten them out, but each asks for wages.You see, anyone who is going to practice his (347a) type of craft well never does or enjoins what is best for himself—at least not when he is acting as his craft prescribes—but what is best for his subject. It
is because of this, it seems, that wages must be provided to a person if he is going to be willing to rule, whether they are in the form of money or honor or a penalty if he refuses.
GLAUCON: What do you mean, Socrates? I am familiar with the first two kinds of wages, but I do not understand what penalty you mean, or how you can call it a wage.
SOCRATES: Then you do not understand the sort of wages for which the best people rule, when they are willing to rule. Don’t you know that those (b) who love honor and those who love money are despised, and rightly so?
GLAUCON: I do.
SOCRATES: Well, then, that is why good people won’t be willing to rule for the sake of money or honor.You see, if they are paid wages openly for ruling, they will be called hirelings, and if they take them covertly as the fruits of their rule, they will be called thieves. On the other hand, they won’t rule for the sake of honor either, since they are not ambitious honor- (c) lovers. So, if they are going to be willing to rule, some compulsion or pun- ishment must be brought to bear on them—that is probably why wanting to rule when one does not have to is thought to be shameful. Now, the greatest punishment for being unwilling to rule is being ruled by someone worse than oneself. And I think it is fear of that that makes good people rule when they do rule. They approach ruling, not as though they were going to do something good or as though they were going to enjoy them- selves in it, but as something necessary, since it cannot be entrusted to any- (d) one better than—or even as good as—themselves. In a city of good men, if it came into being, the citizens would fight in order not to rule, just as they now do in order to rule.There it would be quite clear that anyone who is really and truly a ruler does not naturally seek what is advantageous for himself, but what is so for his subject. As a result, anyone with any sense would prefer to be benefited by another than to go to the trouble of bene- fiting him. So I cannot at all agree with Thrasymachus that justice is what is (e) advantageous for the stronger. But we will look further into that another time.What Thrasymachus is now saying—that the life of an unjust person is better than that of a just one—seems to be of far greater importance.
Which life would you choose, Glaucon? And which of our views do you think is closer to the truth?
GLAUCON: I think the life of a just person is more profitable.
SOCRATES: Did you hear all the good things Thrasymachus attributed a moment ago to the unjust man?
GLAUCON: I did, but I am not persuaded.
(348a) SOCRATES: Then do you want us to persuade him, if we can find a way, that what he says is not true?
GLAUCON: Of course I do.
SOCRATES: Well, if we oppose him with a speech parallel to his speech enumerating in turn the many good things that come from being just, and he replies, and then we do, we will have to count and measure the good things mentioned on each side, and we will need a jury to decide the case. (b) But if, on the other hand, we investigate the question, as we have been doing, by seeking agreement with each other, we ourselves can be both jury and advocates at once.
GLAUCON: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then which approach do you prefer?
GLAUCON: The second.
SOCRATES: Come on then,Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning.
You say, don’t you, that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice? (c) THRASYMACHUS: I certainly have said that. And I have told you why.
SOCRATES: Well, then, what do you say about this? Do you call one of the two a virtue and the other a vice?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: That is to say, you call justice a virtue and injustice a vice?
THRASYMACHUS: Is that likely, sweetest one, when I say that injustice is profitable and justice is not?
SOCRATES: Then what exactly do you say?
THRASYMACHUS: The opposite.
SOCRATES: That justice is a vice?
THRASYMACHUS: No, just very noble naiveté.[^24] (d) SOCRATES: So you call injustice deviousness?
THRASYMACHUS: No, I call it being prudent.
SOCRATES: Do you also consider unjust people to be wise and good, Thrasymachus?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, if they do complete injustice and can bring cities and whole nations under their power. Perhaps, you thought I meant pickpockets? Not that such crimes aren’t also profitable, if they are not found out. But they are not worth discussing by comparison to what I described.
Socrates takes him to mean it in the good sense of being straightforward, and so con- trasts it with kakoêtheia—deviousness. See 400e1.
(e) SOCRATES: Yes, I am not unaware of what you mean. But this did surprise me: that you include injustice with virtue and wisdom, and justice with their opposites.
THRASYMACHUS: Nevertheless, that is where I put them.
SOCRATES: That is now a harder problem, comrade, and it is not easy to know what to say in response. If you had declared that injustice is more prof- itable, but agreed that it is a vice or shameful, as some others do, we could be discussing the matter on the basis of conventional views. But now, obviously, you will say that injustice is fine and strong and apply to it all the attributes we (349a) used to apply to justice, since you dare to include it with virtue and wisdom.
THRASYMACHUS: You have guessed my views exactly.
SOCRATES: All the same, we must not shrink from pursuing the argument and looking into this, just as long as I take you to be saying what you really think.You see, I believe that you really are not joking now,Thrasymachus, but saying what you believe to be the truth.
THRASYMACHUS: What difference does it make to you, whether I believe it or not? Isn’t it my account you are supposed to be refuting?
SOCRATES: It makes no difference. But here is a further question I would (b) like you to try to answer: do you think that a just person wants to do bet- ter[^25] than another just person?
THRASYMACHUS: Not at all. Otherwise, he would not be the civilized and naïve person he actually is.
SOCRATES: What about than the just action?
THRASYMACHUS: No, not than that, either.
SOCRATES: And does he claim that he deserves to do better than an unjust person and believe that it is just for him to do so, or doesn’t he believe that?
THRASYMACHUS: He would want to do better than him, and he would claim to deserve to do so, but he would not be able.
SOCRATES: That is not what I am asking, but whether a just person wants, (c) and claims to deserve, to do better than an unjust person, but not than a just one?
THRASYMACHUS: He does.
SOCRATES: What about an unjust person? Does he claim that he deserves to do better than a just person or a just action?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course he does; he thinks he deserves to do better than everyone.
SOCRATES: Then will an unjust person also do better than an unjust person or an unjust action, and will he strive to get the most he can for himself from everyone?
THRASYMACHUS: He will.
SOCRATES: Then let’s put it this way: a just person does not do better than someone like himself, but someone unlike himself, whereas an unjust per- (d) son does better than those who are like and those who are unlike him.
THRASYMACHUS: Very well put.
SOCRATES: Now, an unjust person is wise and good, and a just one is neither?
THRASYMACHUS: That is well put, too.
SOCRATES: So isn’t an unjust person also like a wise and good person, while the just person is not?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course. How could he fail to be like people who have such qualities, when he has them himself? But the unjust person is not like them.
SOCRATES: Fine.Then each of them has the qualities of the people he is like?
THRASYMACHUS: What else could he have?
SOCRATES: All right,Thrasymachus. Do you call one person musical and (e) another non-musical?
THRASYMACHUS: I do.
SOCRATES: Which of them is wise in music and which is not?
THRASYMACHUS: The musical one is wise, presumably, and the other not wise.
SOCRATES: And in the things in which he is wise, he is good; and in the things in which he is not wise, he is bad?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Isn’t the same true of a doctor?
THRASYMACHUS: It is.
SOCRATES: Do you think, then,Thrasymachus, that a man who is a musician, when he is tuning his lyre and tightening and loosening the strings, wants to do better than another musician, and does he claim that that is what he deserves?[^26]
THRASYMACHUS: I do not.
SOCRATES: But he does want to do better than a non-musician? 15 THRASYMACHUS: Necessarily. (350a) SOCRATES: What about a doctor? When he is prescribing food and drink, does he want to do better than another doctor or than medical practice?
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: But he does want to do better than a non-doctor?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: In any branch of knowledge or ignorance, do you think a that knowledgeable person would intentionally try to take more for himself than another knowledgeable person, or to do or say more, and not rather exactly what the one like himself would do in the same situation?
THRASYMACHUS: No, I imagine it must be as you say.
(b) SOCRATES: And what about an ignorant person? Doesn’t he want to do better than both a knowledgeable person and an ignorant one?
THRASYMACHUS: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: A knowledgeable person is wise?
THRASYMACHUS: I agree.
SOCRATES: And a wise one is good?
THRASYMACHUS: I agree.
SOCRATES: So, a good and wise person does not want to do better than someone like himself, but someone both unlike and opposite to him.
THRASYMACHUS: So it seems.
SOCRATES: But a bad and ignorant person wants to do better than both his like and his opposite.
THRASYMACHUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Well, Thrasymachus, we found that an unjust person tries to do better than those like him and those unlike him. Didn’t you say that?
THRASYMACHUS: I did. 15 (c) SOCRATES: And that a just person won’t do better than those like him, but those unlike him?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then a just person is like a wise and good person, and an unjust person is like an ignorant and bad one.
THRASYMACHUS: It looks that way.
SOCRATES: Moreover, we agreed that each has the qualities of the one he resembles.
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, we did.
SOCRATES: A just person has turned out to be good and wise, then, and an unjust one ignorant and bad.
(d) Thrasymachus agreed to all this, not easily as I am telling it, but reluctantly, with toil, trouble, and—since it was summer—a quantity of sweat that was amazing to behold. And then I saw something I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing. But in any case, after we had agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom and that injustice is vice and ignorance, I said:
All right, let’s take that as established. But we also said that injustice is a strong thing, or don’t you remember that,Thrasymachus?
THRASYMACHUS: I remember. But I am not satisfied with what you are now saying. I could make a speech about it, but if I did, I know that you would say I was engaging in demagoguery. So, either allow me to say as (e) much as I want to say or, if you want to keep on asking questions, go ahead and ask them, and I shall say to you—as one does to old women telling sto- ries—“All right,” and nod or shake my head.
SOCRATES: No, don’t do that; not contrary to your own belief.
THRASYMACHUS: Then I will answer to please you, since you won’t let me make a speech.What else do you want?
SOCRATES: Nothing, by Zeus. But if that is what you are going to do, do it, and I will ask the questions.
THRASYMACHUS: Ask them, then.
SOCRATES: All right, I will ask precisely what I asked before, so that we may proceed in an orderly fashion with our argument about what sort of (351a) thing justice is, as opposed to injustice. For it was claimed, I believe, that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice. But now, if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue, it will be easy to show, I suppose, that it is stron- ger than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now be igno- rant of that. However, I, at any rate, do not want to consider the matter in such simple terms,Thrasymachus, but to look into it in some such way as this: would you say that a city may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, and succeed at enslaving them,[^27] and hold them in subjection (b) which it enslaved in the past?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course. And that is what the best city will especially do, the one that is most completely unjust.
SOCRATES: I understand that that is your argument, but the point I want to examine is this: will the city that becomes stronger than another achieve this power without justice, or will it need the help of justice? (c) THRASYMACHUS: If what you said a moment ago stands, and justice is wisdom, it will need the help of justice; but if things are as I stated, it will need the help of injustice.
SOCRATES: I am impressed, Thrasymachus, that you are not merely nod- ding or shaking your head, but giving these fine answers.
THRASYMACHUS: That is because I am trying to please you.
SOCRATES: You are doing well at it, too. So please me some more by answering this question: do you think that a city, an army, a band of robbers or thieves, or any other group with a common unjust purpose would be able to achieve it if its members were unjust to each other? (d) THRASYMACHUS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: What if they were not unjust to one another? Would they achieve more?
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Because, Thrasymachus, injustice causes factions, hatreds, and quarrels among them, while justice brings friendship and a sense of com- mon purpose. Isn’t that so?
THRASYMACHUS: I will say it is, in order not to disagree with you.
SOCRATES: You are still doing well on that front, which is very good of you. So tell me this: if the function of injustice is to produce hatred wher- ever it occurs, then whenever it arises, whether among free men or slaves, won’t it make them hate one another, form factions, and be unable to (e) achieve any common purpose?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: What if it arises between two people? Won’t they be at odds, hate each other, and be enemies both to one another and to just people?
THRASYMACHUS: They will.
SOCRATES: Well, then, my amazing fellow, if injustice arises within a sin- gle individual, will it lose its power or will it retain it undiminished?
THRASYMACHUS: Let’s say that it retains it undiminished.
SOCRATES: Apparently, then, its power is such that whenever it comes to exist in something—whether in a city, a family, an army, or anything else whatsoever—it makes that thing, first of all, incapable of acting in concert (352a) with itself, because of the faction and difference it creates; and, second of all, an enemy to itself, and to what is in every way its opposite: namely, jus- tice. Isn’t that so?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: And in a single individual, too, I presume, it will produce the very same effects that it is in its nature to produce. First, it will make him incapable of acting because of inner faction and not being of one mind with himself; second, it will make him his own enemy as well as the enemy of just people. Isn’t that right?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But, my dear fellow, aren’t the gods also just?
THRASYMACHUS: Let’s say they are.
SOCRATES: Then an unjust person will also be an enemy of the gods, (b) Thrasymachus, while a just person will be their friend?
THRASYMACHUS: Feast yourself confidently on the argument! Don’t worry, I won’t oppose you, so as not to arouse the enmity of our friends here.
SOCRATES: Come on, then, complete the banquet for me by continuing to answer as you have been doing now.We have shown that just people are wiser and better and more capable of acting, while unjust ones are not even (c) able to act together. For whenever we speak of men who are unjust acting together to effectively achieve a common goal, what we say is not alto- gether true.They would never have been able to keep their hands off each other if they were completely unjust. But clearly there must have been some sort of justice in them that at least prevented them from doing injus- tice among themselves at the same time as they were doing it to others.
And it was this that enabled them to achieve what they did. When they started doing unjust things, they were only halfway corrupted by their injustice. For those who are wholly bad and completely unjust are also completely incapable of acting. All this I now see to be the truth, and not (d) what you first maintained. However, we must now examine the question, as we proposed to do before,[^28] of whether just people also live better and are happier than unjust ones. I think it is clear even now from what we have said that this is so, but we must consider it further. After all, the argu- ment concerns no ordinary topic, but the way we ought to live.
THRASYMACHUS: Go ahead and consider.
SOCRATES: I will.Tell me, do you think there is such a thing as the func- tion of a horse? (e) THRASYMACHUS: I do.
SOCRATES: And would you take the function of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it, or best with it?
THRASYMACHUS: I don’t understand.
SOCRATES: Let me put it this way: is it possible for you to see with any- thing except eyes?
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Or for you to hear with anything except ears?
THRASYMACHUS: No.
SOCRATES: Would it be right, then, for us to say that these things are their functions?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Again, couldn’t you use a dagger, a carving knife, or lots of (353a) other things in pruning a vine?
THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But nothing would do a better job than a pruning knife designed for the purpose?
THRASYMACHUS: That’s true.
SOCRATES: Shall we take pruning to be its function, then?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now I think you will understand better what I was asking ear- lier when I asked whether the function of each thing is what it alone can do or what it can do better than anything else.
THRASYMACHUS: I do understand, and I think that that is the function of (b) anything.
SOCRATES: All right. Does there seem to you also to be a virtue[^29] for each thing to which some function is assigned? Let’s go over the same ground again.We say that eyes have some function?
THRASYMACHUS: They do.
SOCRATES: So eyes also have a virtue?
THRASYMACHUS: They do.
SOCRATES: And ears have a function?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So they also have a virtue?
THRASYMACHUS: They have a virtue too.
SOCRATES: What about everything else? Doesn’t the same hold?
THRASYMACHUS: It does.
SOCRATES: Well, then. Could eyes perform their function well if they (c) lacked their proper virtue but had the vice instead?
THRASYMACHUS: How could they? For don’t you mean if they had blind- ness instead of sight?
SOCRATES: Whatever their virtue is.You see, I am not now asking about that, but about whether it is by means of their own proper virtue that their function performs the things it performs well, and by means of vice badly?
THRASYMACHUS: What you say is true.
SOCRATES: So, if ears are deprived of their own virtue, they too perform their function badly?
THRASYMACHUS: Of course. (d) SOCRATES: And the same argument applies to everything else?
THRASYMACHUS: So it seems to me, at least.
SOCRATES: Come on, then, and let’s next consider this: does the soul have some function that you could not perform with anything else—for exam- ple, taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and all other such things? Is there anything else besides a soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they special to it?
THRASYMACHUS: No, there is nothing else.
SOCRATES: Then what about living? Don’t we say that it is a function of a soul?
THRASYMACHUS: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: And don’t we also say that a soul has a virtue?
THRASYMACHUS: We do.
SOCRATES: Will a soul ever perform its functions well, then, Thrasyma- (e) chus, if it is deprived of its own proper virtue, or is that impossible?
THRASYMACHUS: It is impossible.
SOCRATES: It is necessary, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things badly, and that a good soul does all these things well?
THRASYMACHUS: It is necessary.
SOCRATES: Now, didn’t we agree that justice is a soul’s virtue and injustice its vice?
THRASYMACHUS: Yes, we did agree.
SOCRATES: So a just soul and a just man will live well and an unjust one badly.
THRASYMACHUS: Apparently so, according to your argument.
SOCRATES: And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy, and (354a) anyone who does not is the opposite.
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Therefore, a just person is happy and an unjust one wretched.
THRASYMACHUS: Let’s say so.
SOCRATES: But surely it is profitable, not to be wretched, but to be happy.
THRASYMACHUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: So then, blessed Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profit- able than justice.
THRASYMACHUS: Let that be your banquet, Socrates, at the feast of Bendis.
SOCRATES: Given by you, Thrasymachus, after you became gentle with me and ceased to be difficult.Yet I have not had a good banquet. But that is (b) my fault, not yours. I seem to have behaved like those gluttons who snatch at every dish that passes and taste it before having properly savored the pre- ceding one. Before finding the first thing we inquired about—namely, what justice is—I let that go, and turned to investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of wisdom and virtue.Then an argument came up about injustice being more profitable than justice, and I could not refrain from abandoning the previous one and following up on it. Hence the result of the discussion, so far as I am concerned, is that I know noth- (c) ing. For when I do not know what justice is, I will hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy.