Book 9

SOCRATES’ NARRATION CONTINUES: (571a) SOCRATES: The tyrannical man himself remains to be investigated: how he evolves from a democratic one, what he is like once he has come to exist, and whether the way he lives is wretched or blessedly happy.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, he still remains.

SOCRATES: Do you know what else I still miss?

ADEIMANTUS: What?

SOCRATES: I do not think we have adequately distinguished the nature and number of our appetites.1 And if that subject is not adequately dealt (b) with, our investigation will lack clarity.

ADEIMANTUS: Well, isn’t now as fine a time as any?

SOCRATES: It certainly is. So, consider what I want to look at in them. It is this: among unnecessary pleasures and appetites, there are some that seem to me to be lawless.These are probably present in all of us, but they are held in check by the laws and by our better appetites allied with reason. In a few people they have been eliminated entirely or only a few weak ones remain, (c) while in others they are stronger and more numerous.

ADEIMANTUS: Which ones do you mean?

SOCRATES: The ones that wake up when we are asleep, whenever the rest of the soul—the rational, gentle, and ruling element—slumbers. Then the bestial and savage part, full of food or drink, comes alive, casts off sleep, and seeks to go and gratify its own characteristic instincts.You know it will dare to do anything in such a state, released and freed from all shame and wis- dom. In fantasy, it does not shrink from trying to have sex with a mother or (d) with anyone else—man, god, or beast. It will commit any foul murder, and there is no food it refuses to eat. In a word, it does not refrain from any- thing, no matter how foolish or shameful.

ADEIMANTUS: That’s absolutely true.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, I suppose someone who keeps himself healthy and temperate will awaken his rational element before going to [1]: A topic briefly discussed at 558d4–559d2.

sleep and feast it on fine arguments and investigations, which he has brought to an agreed conclusion within himself. As for the appetitive ele- (e) ment, he neither starves nor overfeeds it, so it will slumber and not disturb the best element with its pleasure or pain but will leave it alone, just by (572a) itself and pure, to investigate and reach out for the perception of some- thing—whether past, present, or future—that it does not know. He soothes the spirited element in a similar way and does not get angry and fall asleep with his spirit still aroused. And when he has calmed these two elements and stimulated the third, in which wisdom resides, he takes his rest.You know this is the state in which he most readily grasps the truth and in (b) which the visions appearing in his dreams are least lawless.

ADEIMANTUS: I completely agree.

SOCRATES: Well, we have been led a bit astray and said a bit too much.

What we want to pay attention to is this: there are appetites of a terrible, savage, and lawless kind in everyone—even in those of us who seem to be entirely moderate. This surely becomes clear in sleep. Do you think I am talking sense? Do you agree with me?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, I do agree.

SOCRATES: Now, recall what we said the democratic man is like.2 He was

(c) the result, we presumed, of a childhood upbringing by a thrifty father who honored only appetites that made money and despised the unnecessary ones whose objects are amusement and showing off. Isn’t that right?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And by associating with more sophisticated men who are full of the appetites we just described, he starts to indulge in every kind of arro- gance and adopt their kind of behavior, because of his hatred of his father’s thrift. But, since he has a better nature than his corrupters, he is pulled in both directions and settles in the middle between their two ways of life.And (d) enjoying each in what he takes to be moderation, he lives a life that is nei- ther illiberal nor lawless, transformed now from an oligarch to a democrat.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that was—and still is—our belief about someone like that.

SOCRATES: Suppose, then, that this man has now in turn become older and has a son who is also brought up in his father’s way of life.

ADEIMANTUS: I will.

SOCRATES: Suppose, too, that the same things happen to him as happened to his father: he is led into all the kinds of lawlessness that those leading him (e) call total freedom. His father and the rest of his family come to the aid of [2]: 558c–562a2.

the appetites that are in the middle, while the others help the opposite ones. And when these terrible enchanters and tyrant-makers have no hope of keeping hold of the young man in any other way, they contrive to implant a powerful passion in him as the popular leader of those idle and (573a) profligate appetites—a sort-of great, winged drone. Or do you think pas- sion is ever anything else in such people?

ADEIMANTUS: I certainly do not think it is.

SOCRATES: And when the other appetites come buzzing around—filled with incense, perfumes, wreaths, wine, and all the other pleasures found in such company, they feed the drone, make it grow as large as possible, and plant the sting of longing in it.Then this popular leader of the soul adopts (b) madness as its bodyguard and is stung to frenzy. If it finds any beliefs or appetites in the man that are regarded as good or are still moved by shame, it destroys them and throws them out, until it has purged him of temper- ance and filled him with imported madness.

ADEIMANTUS: You have perfectly described how a tyrannical man comes to exist.

SOCRATES: Is that, then, why Passion has long been called a tyrant?

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

SOCRATES: And hasn’t a drunken man, my friend, something of a tyranni- (c) cal cast of mind, too?

ADEIMANTUS: He has.

SOCRATES: And of course someone who is mad and deranged attempts to rule not only human beings, but gods as well, and expects to be able to rule them.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: A man becomes tyrannical in the precise sense, then, you mar- velous fellow, when his nature or his practices or both together lead him to drunkenness, passion, and melancholia.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, that, it seems, is how a tyrannical man comes to exist.

Now, what is his life like? (d) ADEIMANTUS: Why don’t you tell me, as askers of riddles usually do?

SOCRATES: I will tell you.You see, I think someone in whom the tyrant of Passion dwells, and in whom it serves as captain of everything in the soul, next goes in for festivals, revelries, luxuries, girlfriends, and all that sort of thing.

ADEIMANTUS: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: And don’t lots of terrible appetites sprout up each day and night beside it, creating needs for all sorts of things?

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, they do.

SOCRATES: So, any income someone like that has is soon spent.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And the next thing, surely, is borrowing and expenditure of (e) capital.

ADEIMANTUS: What else?

SOCRATES: And when everything is gone, won’t the violent crowd of appetites that have nested within him inevitably shout in protest? And when people of this sort are driven by the stings of these other appetites, but par- ticularly of Passion itself, which leads all the others as if they were its body- guard, stung to frenzy, don’t they look to see who possesses anything that (574a) can be taken from him by deceit or force?

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: He must take it from every source, then, or live in great suffer- ing and pain.

ADEIMANTUS: He must.

SOCRATES: And just as the late-coming pleasures within him do better than the older ones and steal away their satisfactions, won’t he himself, young as he is, think he deserves to do better3 than his father and mother?

And if he has spent his own share, won’t he try to take some of his father’s wealth by converting it to his own use?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course. (b) SOCRATES: And if his parents resist him, won’t he first try to steal it and deceive them?

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And if he cannot, won’t he next try to seize it by force?

ADEIMANTUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: And if, you amazing man, the old man and woman stand their (a) ground and put up a fight, would he take care and be reluctant to act like tyrant?

ADEIMANTUS: I am not very optimistic about the parents of someone like that!

SOCRATES: But in the name of Zeus, Adeimantus, do you really think that for the sake of his latest love, an unnecessary girlfriend, he would strike his [3]: See Glossary of Terms s.v. do better.

mother, who is his oldest and necessary friend? Or that for the sake of his (c) latest and unnecessary boyfriend, who is in the bloom of youth, he would strike his aged and necessary father, the oldest of his friends, who is no longer in the bloom of youth? Or that he would enslave his parents to them, if he brought them into the same house?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, by Zeus, he would.

SOCRATES: It seems to be a great blessing to produce a tyrannical son!

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly does!

SOCRATES: What happens to someone like that when the possessions of (d) his father and mother give out and the swarm of pleasures now inside him has grown dense? Won’t he first try to break into someone’s house or snatch the cloak of someone walking late at night? Next, won’t he try to clean out some temple? And in the course of all that, his old childhood beliefs about fine or shameful things—beliefs that are accounted just—are mastered by the new ones that have been released from slavery and, as the bodyguard of Passion, hold sway along with it.These are the ones that used to be freed in sleep as a dream, when he himself, since he was still subject to the laws and (e) his father, had a democratic constitution within him. But under the tyr- anny of Passion, what he used to become occasionally in his dreams he has now become permanently while awake, and so there is no terrible murder, no food, and no act from which he will refrain. On the contrary, Passion (575a) lives like a tyrant within him in complete anarchy and lawlessness, as his sole ruler, and drives him, as if he were a city, to dare anything that will provide sustenance for itself and the unruly mob around it—some of which have come in from the outside as a result of his bad associates, while others have come from within, freed and let loose by his own bad habits. Isn’t this the life such a man leads?

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: And if there are only a few men like that in a city, and the (b) majority of the others are temperate, they emigrate in order to become the bodyguard of some other tyrant or serve as paid auxiliaries if there happens to be a war somewhere. But if they chance to live in a time of peace and calm, they stay right there in the city and cause lots of little evils.

ADEIMANTUS: What sort of evils do you mean?

SOCRATES: They steal, break into houses, snatch purses, steal clothes, rob temples, and kidnap people. Sometimes, if they are capable speakers, they become sycophants and bear false witness and accept bribes.4 (a) ADEIMANTUS: You mean they are small evils—provided there are only (c) few such people.

[4]: See Glossary of Terms s.v. sycophants.

SOCRATES: Yes. After all, small evils are small by comparison to big ones.

And when it comes to producing corruption and misery in a city, all these evils together do not—as the saying goes—come within a mile of a tyrant. (a) But when you get a large number of these people and their followers in city, and they become aware of their numbers, they are the ones who— together with the foolishness of the people—create the tyrant out of the (d) one among them who has in his soul the greatest and strongest tyrant of all.

ADEIMANTUS: Naturally, since he would be the most tyrannical.

SOCRATES: That’s if they submit willingly. But if the city doesn’t put itself in his hands, then just as he once chastised his mother and father, he will now punish his fatherland in the same way, if he can, bringing in new friends and making and keeping his once beloved motherland—as the Cretans call it—or fatherland their slaves. And that is surely the end at which the appetites of a man like that aim. (e) ADEIMANTUS: It most certainly is.

SOCRATES: So, isn’t this what such men are like in private life, before they start to rule? In the first place, don’t they associate with flatterers who are ready to do anything to serve them? Or, if they need something from someone themselves, won’t they grovel and willingly engage in any sort of (576a) posturing, the way slaves do? But once they get what they need, isn’t it a different story altogether?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, completely different.

SOCRATES: So, those with a tyrannical nature live their entire lives without ever being friends with anyone, always masters to one man or slaves to another, but never getting a taste of freedom or true friendship.

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Wouldn’t we be right to call people like that untrustworthy?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And as unjust as anyone can be—assuming we were right in (b) our earlier conclusions about what justice is like.

ADEIMANTUS: And we certainly were right.

SOCRATES: Let’s sum up the worst type of man, then. He is surely the one who, when awake, is like the dreaming person we described earlier.5

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And he evolves from someone who, since he is by nature most tyrannical, achieves sole rule. And the longer he lives as tyrant, the more like that he becomes.

[5]: See 571c–d.

“Inevitably,” said Glaucon, taking over the argument. SOCRATES: Well, then, won’t the one who is plainly worst also be plainly (c) most wretched? And the one who for the longest time is most a tyrant, won’t he also be most wretched for the longest time, if truth be told?

Though the views of the masses6 on the subject are naturally also many.

GLAUCON: All that, at any rate, must be true. (a) SOCRATES: Doesn’t a tyrannical man correspond to and most resemble city ruled by a tyrant, a democratic man a democratically ruled city, and similarly with the others?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And the comparison between city and city, as regards their vir- tue and happiness, isn’t it the same as the comparison between man and man? (d) GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: As regards virtue, then, how does a city ruled by a tyrant com- pare to a city of the sort we described first that is ruled by a king?

GLAUCON: They are absolute opposites: one is the best, and the other is the worst.

SOCRATES: I won’t ask you which is which, since it is obvious. But as regards happiness and wretchedness, is your judgment the same or differ- ent? And let’s not become dazzled by looking at the tyrant—since he is just one man—or at the few who surround him. Instead, as is necessary, let’s go in and study the city as a whole and, when we have gone down and looked (e) into every corner, only then present what we believe.

GLAUCON: That’s a good suggestion. And it is clear to everyone that there is no city more wretched than a tyrannical one and none happier than one ruled by a king.

SOCRATES: Would it also be right, then, to suggest the same thing about (577a) the men—that the only fit judge of them is someone who can, in thought, go down into a man’s character and discern it—not someone who sees it from the outside, the way a child does, and is dazzled by the façade that tyrants adopt for the outside world, but someone who discerns it ade- quately? And what if I were to assume that the person we must all listen to is the one who has this capacity to judge; who has lived in the same house as a tyrant and witnessed his behavior at home; who has seen how he deals with each member of his household, when he can best be observed stripped of his tragic costume;7 and who has also seen how he deals with (b) [6]: Literally, the many.

[7]: I.e., the façade referred to earlier. Greek tragedies often had tyrants as characters.

public dangers? Shouldn’t we ask the one who has seen all that to tell us how the tyrant compares to the others with respect to happiness and wretchedness?

GLAUCON: That’s also a very good suggestion.

SOCRATES: Then, in order to have someone to answer our questions, do (a) you want us to pretend that we are among the ones who can make such judgment, and that we have met tyrannical people already?8 GLAUCON: I certainly do.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and examine the matter like this for me. (c) Bearing in mind the resemblance between the city and the man, examine each in turn and describe its condition.

GLAUCON: What kinds of things do you want me to describe?

SOCRATES: Describe the city first.Would you say that a tyrannical city is free or enslaved?

GLAUCON: As enslaved as it is possible to be.

SOCRATES: Yet you can surely see masters and free people in it.

GLAUCON: I can certainly see a small group of people like that. But pretty much the whole population, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved. (d) SOCRATES: If a man and his city are similar, then, mustn’t the same struc- ture exist in him, too? Mustn’t his soul be full of slavery and illiberality, with those same parts of it enslaved, while a small part, the most wicked and most insane, is master?

GLAUCON: It must.

SOCRATES: Will you describe such a soul as enslaved, then, or as free?

GLAUCON: Enslaved, of course.

SOCRATES: And, to go back, isn’t the enslaved, tyrannical city least able to do what it wishes?

GLAUCON: By far the least. (e) SOCRATES: So, a tyrannical soul will also least do what it wishes—I am talking about the soul as a whole—and will be full of disorder and regret, since it is always forcibly driven by a gadfly.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Rich or poor? Which must a tyrannical city be?

GLAUCON: Poor.

[8]: Plato spent time with Dionysius I, tyrant of Sicily.

(578a) SOCRATES: So, a tyrannical soul, too, must always be poor and insatiable.

GLAUCON: It must.

SOCRATES: What about fear? Mustn’t a city of this sort and a man of this sort be filled with it?

GLAUCON: They certainly must.

SOCRATES: And do you think you will find more wailing, groaning, lamenting, or painful suffering in any other city?

GLAUCON: No.

SOCRATES: What about in a man? Do you think such things are more common in anyone than in this tyrannical man, maddened by his appetites and passions?

GLAUCON: How could I?

SOCRATES: I imagine it is in view of all these things, then, as well as others (b) like them, that you judged this city to be the most wretched of cities.

GLAUCON: And wasn’t I right?

SOCRATES: Yes, of course. But how, again, do you describe the tyrannical man in view of these same things?

GLAUCON: He is by far the most wretched of them all.

SOCRATES: There your description is no longer right.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: This man, I think, is not yet the most wretched.

GLAUCON: Then who is?

SOCRATES: Presumably, you will regard this next one as even more wretched.

GLAUCON: What one?

SOCRATES: The tyrannical man who does not live out his life as a private (c) individual, but is unlucky, in that some misfortune gives him the opportu- nity of becoming an actual tyrant.

GLAUCON: On the basis of what we have already said, I infer that what you are saying is true.

SOCRATES: Yes. But it is not good enough to believe these claims; one must carefully examine someone like that by means of argument. After all, the investigation concerns the most important thing—a good life and (a) bad one.9 GLAUCON: That’s absolutely right.

[9]: See 344e1–3.

SOCRATES: So, consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say.You (d) see, I think we should investigate him on the basis of the following.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: On the basis of each and every one of the wealthy private citi- zens in our cities who own many slaves. For they resemble a tyrant in ruling over many, although the number ruled by the tyrant is different.

GLAUCON: It is different.

SOCRATES: You know, then, that these people feel secure and do not fear their slaves.

GLAUCON: Of what have they to be afraid, after all?

SOCRATES: Nothing. But do you know why?

GLAUCON: Yes. Because the whole city is ready to defend each of its pri- vate citizens.

SOCRATES: That’s right. But now, suppose some god were to lift one of (e) these men, who has fifty or more slaves, out of the city, and put him (a) down—with his wife, his children, his slaves, and his other property—in deserted place, where no free men could come to his assistance? Can you imagine the sort and amount of fear he would feel that he and his wife and children would be killed by his slaves?

GLAUCON: It would be huge, if you ask me.

SOCRATES: Wouldn’t he at that point be compelled to start fawning on (579a) some of his slaves, promising them all sorts of things and setting them free—even though there was nothing he wanted to do less—and wouldn’t he turn out to be a flatterer of slaves?

GLAUCON: He would have to be. Otherwise, he would be killed.

SOCRATES: Now, suppose the god were to settle many other neighbors around him who would not tolerate anyone claiming to be master of another, but if they caught such a person, would inflict the most extreme punishments on him?

GLAUCON: I suppose he would be in even worse trouble, since he would (b) be surrounded by nothing but enemies.

SOCRATES: So, isn’t this, then, the kind of prison in which the tyrant is held—the one whose nature we have described, filled with multifarious fears and passions? Though his soul is really greedy, he is the only one in the city who cannot go abroad or look at the sights at which other free people yearn to look. Instead, he is mostly stuck in house, living like a woman,10 (c) envying any other citizen who goes abroad and sees some good thing.

[10]: See 451d7 note.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Isn’t such a harvest of evils, then, a measure of the difference between a tyrannical man who is badly governed politically on the inside— whom you judged just now to be most wretched—and one who does not live out his life as a private individual, but is compelled by some chance to become an actual tyrant and try to rule others, when he cannot even master himself? It is as if someone with a body that is sick and cannot master itself were compelled, not to spend his life in private pursuits, but to compete (d) and fight with other bodies.

GLAUCON: That’s exactly what he is like.Your description is absolutely true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And so, my dear Glaucon, isn’t his condition completely wretched, and isn’t the life of a tyrant even harsher than the one you judged to be harshest?

GLAUCON: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: So, in truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really a slave to the worst sorts of fawning and slavery, and a flat- (e) terer of the worst kind of people. He is so far from satisfying his appetites in any way that he is in the greatest need of most things and truly poor—as is apparent if one knows how to look at a whole soul. He is full of fear throughout his life and overflowing with convulsions and pains, if in fact his condition is like that of the city he rules. And it is like it, isn’t it?

GLAUCON: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And, in addition, shouldn’t we also attribute to the man the (580a) qualities we mentioned earlier? We said that he is inevitably envious, untrustworthy, unjust, friendless, impious, and a host and nurse to every (a) kind of vice; that ruling makes him even more so than before; and that, as consequence, he is extremely unfortunate and goes on to make those near him so.

GLAUCON: No one with any sense could possibly contradict that.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and tell me now at last, like the judge who makes the final decision,11 who you believe is first in happiness and who (b) second, and judge the others similarly, making five altogether—kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, tyrannical.

GLAUCON: That’s an easy judgment.You see, I rank them in the order of their appearance, just as if they were choruses, both in virtue and vice and in happiness and its opposite.

[11]: The reference is to the way plays were judged at dramatic festivals in Athens. A herald announced the results.

SOCRATES: Shall we, then, hire a herald, or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston12 has given as his verdict that the best and most just is the (c) most happy, and that he is the one who is most kingly and rules like a king over himself; whereas the worst and most unjust is the most wretched, and he, again, is the one who, because he is most tyrannical, is the greatest tyrant over himself and his city?

GLAUCON: You have announced it!

SOCRATES: And shall I add that it holds whether or not their characters remain hidden from all human beings and gods?13 GLAUCON: Do add it.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is one of our demonstrations. But look at this (d) second one and see if you think there is anything in it.

GLAUCON: What is it?

SOCRATES: In just the way a city is divided into three classes, the soul of each person is also divided in three. That is the reason I think there is another demonstration.

GLAUCON: What is it?

SOCRATES: The following. It seems to me that the three also have three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each. The same holds of appetites and kinds of rule.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: One element, we say, is that with which a person learns; another, that with which he feels anger. As for the third, because it is mul- tiform, we had no one special name for it but named it after the biggest and (e) strongest thing it has in it. I mean we called it the appetitive element because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things that go along with them. We also called it the money-loving ele- ment,14 because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money. (581a) GLAUCON: And we were right.

SOCRATES: So, if we said its pleasure and love are for profit, wouldn’t that best bring it together under one heading for the purposes of our argument and make clear to us what we mean when we speak of this part of the soul?

And would we be right in calling it money-loving and profit-loving?

GLAUCON: I think so, anyway.

[12]: Glaucon, but also, perhaps, his brother Plato.

[13]: See 367e1–5, 612a8–b5.

[14]: At 553c5.

SOCRATES: What about the spirited element? Don’t we say that its whole aim is always mastery, victory, and high repute? (b) GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then wouldn’t it strike the right note for us to call it victory- loving and honor-loving?

GLAUCON: The absolutely right one.

SOCRATES: But surely it is clear to everyone that the element we learn with is always wholly straining to know where the truth lies, and that of the three it cares least for money and reputation.

GLAUCON: By far the least.

SOCRATES: Wouldn’t it be appropriate, then, for us to call it learning loving and philosophic?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And doesn’t it rule in some people’s souls, while one of the (c) others—whichever it happens to be—rules in other people’s?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And isn’t that why we say there are three primary types of people, philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-loving?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And also three kinds of pleasure, one assigned to each of them?

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: You realize, then, that if you chose to ask each of these three types of people in turn to tell you which of their lives is most pleasant, each would give the highest praise to his own? Won’t the moneymaker say that, compared to that of making a profit, the pleasures of being honored or of (d) learning are worthless unless there is something in them that makes money?

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: What about the honor-lover? Doesn’t he think the pleasure of making money is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning—except to the extent that learning brings honor—is smoke and nonsense?

GLAUCON: He does.

SOCRATES: As for the philosopher, what do you suppose he thinks of the (e) other pleasures in comparison to that of knowing where the truth lies and always enjoying some variety of it while he is learning? Won’t he think they are far behind? And won’t he call them really necessary,15 since he would have no need for them if they were not necessary for life?

[15]: See 559a1–b7.

GLAUCON: He will.We can be sure of that.

SOCRATES: Since the pleasures of each kind and the lives themselves dis- pute with one another—not about which life is finer or more shameful or better or worse—but about which is more pleasant and less painful, how (582a) are we to know which of them is speaking the absolute truth?

GLAUCON: I have no idea how to answer that.

SOCRATES: Consider the matter this way: how should we judge things if we want to judge them well? Isn’t it by experience, knowledge, and argu- ment? Or could someone have better criteria than these?

GLAUCON: No, of course not.

SOCRATES: Consider, then. Of the three types of men, which has most experience of the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think the profit-lover learns what the truth itself is like, or has more experience of the pleasure of (b) knowing, than the philosopher does of making a profit?

GLAUCON: There is a big difference between them.You see, the latter has to have tasted the other kinds of pleasure beginning from childhood. But it is not necessary for the profit-lover to taste or experience how sweet is the pleasure of learning the nature of the things that are—and even if he were eager to, he could not easily do so.

SOCRATES: So, the philosopher is far superior to the profit-lover in his experience of both kinds of pleasures. (c) GLAUCON: Very far superior.

SOCRATES: What about compared to the honor-lover? Is he more inexpe- rienced in the pleasure of being honored than the latter is in the pleasure of knowing?

GLAUCON: No. Honor comes to all of them, provided they accomplish their several aims. For the rich man, too, is honored by many people, as well as are the courageous and the wise ones. So, all have experienced what the pleasure of being honored is like. But the pleasure pertaining to the sight of what is cannot be tasted by anyone except the philosopher.

SOCRATES: So, as far as experience goes, then, he is the finest judge (d) among the three types of men.

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: And he alone will have gained his experience with the help of knowledge.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Moreover, the tool that should be used to judge is not the tool of the profit-lover or the honor-lover, but of the philosopher.

GLAUCON: What one is that?

SOCRATES: Surely we said that judgment should be made by means of arguments. Didn’t we?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And arguments are, above all, his tool.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: If the things being judged were best judged by means of [15]: wealth and profit, the praise and criticism of the profit-lover would nec- (e) essarily be closest to the truth.

GLAUCON: It would indeed.

SOCRATES: And if by means of honor, victory, and courage, wouldn’t it be those of the honor-lover and victory-lover?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But since it is by means of experience, knowledge, and argu- ment?

GLAUCON: The praise of the philosopher and argument-lover must be closest to the truth.

SOCRATES: So, of the three pleasures, then, the most pleasant would be (583a) that of the part of the soul with which we learn, and the one of us in whom it rules has the most pleasant life.

GLAUCON: How could it be otherwise? The knowledgeable person at least praises with authority when he praises his own life.

SOCRATES: What life and pleasure does the judge say are in second place?

GLAUCON: Clearly, those of the warrior and honor-lover, since they are closer to his own than those of the moneymaker.

SOCRATES: Then those of the profit-lover come last, apparently.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that makes two in a row. And twice the just person (b) has defeated the unjust one. Now comes the third, which is dedicated in Olympic fashion to our savior, Olympian Zeus.16 Observe, then, that the other pleasures—apart from that of the knowledgeable person—are neither entirely true nor pure. On the contrary, they are like some sort of illusionist painting, as I think I have heard some wise person say.Yet, if that were true, it would be the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows.

[16]: The first toast at a banquet was to the Olympian Zeus, the third to our savior, Zeus. By combining both in a single form of address, Plato seems to be emphasizing the importance of this final proof.

GLAUCON: By far the greatest. But what exactly do you mean? (c) SOCRATES: I will find out, if you answer the questions while I ask them.

GLAUCON: Start asking, then.

SOCRATES: Tell me, then, don’t we say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Isn’t there also a state of feeling neither enjoyment nor pain?

GLAUCON: There is.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it in the middle between these two, a sort of quiet state of the soul where they are concerned? Or wouldn’t you describe it that way?

GLAUCON: I would.

SOCRATES: So then do you recall the sorts of things ill people say when they are ill?

GLAUCON: Which ones?

SOCRATES: That nothing is more pleasant than being healthy, but they had (d) not realized it was most pleasant until they fell ill.

GLAUCON: I do remember that.

SOCRATES: Don’t you also hear people who are in great pain saying that nothing is more pleasant than the cessation of one’s suffering?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: And there are many similar circumstances, I presume, in which you see people in pain praising not enjoyment, but freedom from pain, and respite from that sort of thing, as most pleasant.

GLAUCON: Yes. For at such times, the respite presumably becomes pleas- ant enough to content them.

SOCRATES: And when someone ceases to enjoy something, this respite (e) from pleasure will be painful.

GLAUCON: Presumably.

SOCRATES: So, the quiet state we just now described as being in between the two will sometimes be both pain and pleasure.

GLAUCON: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And is it possible for what is neither to become both?

GLAUCON: Not in my view.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, when what is pleasant and what is painful arise in the soul, they are both a sort of motion, aren’t they?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And didn’t we see just now that what is neither painful nor (584a) pleasant is a respite and in the middle between the two?

GLAUCON: Yes, we did.

SOCRATES: How can it be right, then, to think that the absence of pain is pleasant or the absence of enjoyment painful?

GLAUCON: There’s no way it can be.

SOCRATES: So, it is not right. But when the quiet state is next to what is painful, it appears pleasant; and when it is next to what is pleasant, it appears painful. And there is nothing sound in these illusions as far as the truth about pleasure is concerned. On the contrary, they are a sort of sorcery.

GLAUCON: That’s what the argument suggests, at any rate.

SOCRATES: Well, then, take a look at pleasures that do not derive from (b) pains, so that you won’t be likely to think that, in their case, it is the nature of pleasure to be just the cessation of pain or of pain to be just the cessation of pleasure.

GLAUCON: Where am I to look? What pleasures do you mean?

SOCRATES: There are lots of others, but you might especially want to think about the pleasures of smell.You see, without being preceded by pain, they suddenly become incredibly intense. And when they cease, they leave no pain behind.

GLAUCON: That’s absolutely true.

SOCRATES: So, let’s not be persuaded that pure pleasure is relief from pain, (c) or pure pain relief from pleasure.

GLAUCON: No, let’s not.

SOCRATES: However, of the so-called pleasures that reach the soul through the body, pretty much the greatest number—and the most intense ones, too—are of that kind: they are some sort of relief from pains.

GLAUCON: Yes, they are.

SOCRATES: And aren’t those pleasures and pains of anticipation, which arise from the expectation of future pleasures or pains, of the same kind?

GLAUCON: They are. (d) SOCRATES: Do you know what they are like and what they most resemble?

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: Do you think there is such a thing in the natural world as an up, a down, and a middle?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Don’t you imagine, then, that if someone were brought from down below to the middle, he would think anything other than that he was moving upward? And if he stood at the middle and saw where he had come from, could he possibly think he was anywhere other than the upper region, since he hadn’t seen the one that is truly up above?

GLAUCON: By Zeus, I do not see how he could think anything else. (e) SOCRATES: But if he were brought back again, wouldn’t he think he was being brought down? And wouldn’t he be thinking the truth?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And wouldn’t all this happen to him because he is inexperi- enced in what is truly and really up, middle, and down?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Would it surprise you, then, if those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound beliefs about lots of other things as well—that they are so disposed toward pleasure, pain, and the middle state that, whenever (585a) they descend to the painful, they think the truth and really are in pain; but that, when they ascend from the painful to the middle state, they firmly think they have reached fulfillment and pleasure? Like people who compare black to gray without having experienced white, don’t they compare pain to painlessness while being inexperienced in pleasure, and so get deceived?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, it would not surprise me! In fact, I would be very surprised if it were not like that.

SOCRATES: Think of it this way, then: Aren’t hunger, thirst, and the like (b) some sort of emptiness related to the state of the body?

GLAUCON: They are.

SOCRATES: And isn’t foolishness and lack of knowledge, in turn, some sort of emptiness related to the state of the soul?

GLAUCON: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Aren’t people filled when they take in nourishment or gain understanding?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Does the truer filling belong to what is less or to what is more?

GLAUCON: Clearly, it belongs to what is more.

SOCRATES: Which of the two types, then, partakes more of pure being?

The sorts belonging to bread, drink, relishes, and nourishment in general?

Or the kind belonging to true belief, knowledge, understanding, and, in (c) sum, to all of virtue? Judge it this way: what belongs to what is always the same, immortal, and true, is itself of that sort, and comes to be in something

of that sort—it is more, don’t you think, than what belongs to what is never the same and mortal, is itself of that kind, and comes to be in something of that kind?

GLAUCON: Far more.What belongs to what is always the same is far superior.

SOCRATES: And does the being of what is always the same partake any more of being than of knowledge?17 GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: What about of truth?

GLAUCON: Not of it, either.

SOCRATES: And if less of truth, less of being, too?

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it generally true that the types concerned with the care of (d) the body partake less in truth and being than do those concerned with the care of the soul?

GLAUCON: Yes, much less.

SOCRATES: Don’t you think the same holds of the body in comparison to the soul?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Then isn’t what is filled with things that are more, and is itself more, more really filled than what is filled with things that are less, and is itself less?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So, then, if being filled with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasant, what is more filled with things that are more is more really and (e) truly caused to enjoy a more true pleasure; whereas what partakes of things that are less is less truly and surely filled and partakes of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.

GLAUCON: That’s absolutely inevitable. (586a) SOCRATES: So, those who lack experience of knowledge or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down, apparently, and then back up to the middle state; and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or brought up to it, never filled with what really is, and never tast- ing any stable or pure pleasure. On the contrary, they are always looking downward like cattle and, with their heads bent over the earth or the din- ner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. And, in order to do better than [17]: See 477a2–4.

(b) others in these things, they kick and butt with iron horns and hooves, kill- ing each other, because their desires are insatiable.18 For they aren’t using things that are to fill the part of themselves that is a thing that is, and a leak- proof vessel.19 GLAUCON: You have described the life of “the many,” Socrates, just like an oracle!

SOCRATES: So, isn’t it necessary, then, for these people to live with plea- sures that are mixed with pains, mere phantoms and illusionist paintings of true pleasures? And aren’t they so colored by their juxtaposition with one (c) another that they appear intense, beget mad passions for themselves in the foolish, and are fought over—as Stesichorus tells us the phantom of Helen was fought over at Troy—through ignorance of the truth?20

GLAUCON: Something like that must be what happens.

SOCRATES: Mustn’t similar things happen to someone who succeeds in satisfying the spirited element? Mustn’t his love of honor be so colored by envy, his love of victory by violence, and his spiritedness by peevishness,21 (d) that he pursues the satisfactions of honor, victory, and spiritedness without rational calculation or understanding?

GLAUCON: The same sorts of things must happen with regard to that ele- ment, too.

SOCRATES: Can’t we confidently assert, then, that, even where the desires of the profit-loving and honor-loving parts are concerned, those that fol- low knowledge and argument, and pursue with their help the pleasures that wisdom prescribes, will attain—to the degree that they can attain true plea- sure at all—the truest pleasures, because they follow truth, and those that (e) are most their own; if, indeed, what is the best for each thing is also what is most its own?

GLAUCON: But that, of course, is what is most its own.

SOCRATES: So, when the entire soul follows the philosophic element and does not engage in faction, the result is that each element does its own work and is just; and, in particular, each enjoys its own pleasures, the best (587a) pleasures and—to the degree possible—the truest.

[18]: See 372e2–373e7.

[19]: Stegnon: contrasted in the Gorgias (493a1–b3) with the “leaking jar” in which the appetites are located.

[20]: According to the story, Stesichorus wrote a poem defaming Helen and was pun- ished by being struck with blindness. His sight was restored when he added a verse to the poem in which he claimed that it was a phantom of Helen and not Helen herself who was at Troy. See Phaedrus 243a.

[21]: Envy, violence, and peevishness are all painful conditions that enhance the honor- lover’s pleasures through contrast.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, when one of the other parts gains mastery, the result is that it cannot discover its own pleasure and compels the other parts to pursue an alien, and not a true pleasure.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And wouldn’t what is most distant from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce that result?

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: And isn’t what is most distant from reason the very thing that is most distant from law and order?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And wasn’t it made evident that the passionate and tyrannical (b) appetites are most distant?

GLAUCON: By far the most.

SOCRATES: And the kingly and orderly ones least distant?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the tyrant, I suppose, will be most distant from a true pleasure that is his own, while the king will be least distant.

GLAUCON: It is inevitable.

SOCRATES: And so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly and the king most pleasantly.

GLAUCON: It is absolutely inevitable.

SOCRATES: Do you know, then, how much more unpleasant the tyrant’s life is than the king’s?

GLAUCON: Not unless you tell me.

SOCRATES: There are, it seems, three pleasures: one genuine and two ille- (c) gitimate.The tyrant is at the extreme end of the illegitimate ones, since he flees both law and reason and lives with a bodyguard of slavish pleasures.

But it is not at all easy to say just how inferior he is—except perhaps as follows.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: The tyrant is somehow at a third remove from the oligarch, since the democrat was in the middle between them.[^22] GLAUCON: Yes.

[22]: Third because the Greeks always counted the first as well as the last member of a series. The day after tomorrow was the third day.

SOCRATES: Won’t he also live with a phantom of pleasure, then, that, as regards truth, is at a third remove from that other—if what we said before is true?

GLAUCON: He will.

SOCRATES: But the oligarch, in turn, is at a third remove from the king,23 (d) if we assume king and aristocrat to be the same.

GLAUCON: Yes, third.

SOCRATES: So a tyrant is removed from true pleasure by a numerical value of three times three.

GLAUCON: Apparently.

SOCRATES: So, on the basis of the size of this numerical value, it seems the phantom of the tyrant’s pleasure is a plane figure.

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: On the basis of its square and cube, in that case, it becomes clear how far removed it is.

GLAUCON: Clear to someone skilled in calculation, anyway!

SOCRATES: Turning it the other way around, then, if someone wants to (e) say how far the king is removed from the tyrant in terms of true pleasure, he will find, if he completes the calculation, that he lives 729 times more pleasantly, while the tyrant lives the same number of times more painfully.24 GLAUCON: That’s an extraordinary calculation of the difference between (588a) the two men—the just one and the unjust one—in terms of their pleasure and pain!

[23]: Because the timocrat is between them.

[24]: Socrates’ mathematics is difficult to follow. He seems to have something like this in mind: the tyrant’s pleasure is a two-dimensional image (a plane figure) of the true, three-dimensional pleasure of the philosopher. Hence, if a one-unit square represents the degree of closeness to true pleasure of an image nine times removed from it, true pleasure should be represented by a nine-unit cube. It follows that the king lives 729 times more pleasantly than the tyrant. However, in order to reach the significant number 729—there are 729 days and nights in a year of 364 twenty- four–hour days and 729 months in the “great year” recognized by the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus—Socrates has had to make two rather fast moves. First, he illegitimately capitalizes on the Greek manner of counting series in order to count the oligarch twice, once as the last term in his first series (tyrant, democrat, oli- garch) and again as the first term in his second series (oligarch, timocrat, king). Sec- ond, he multiplies the number of times the tyrant is removed from the oligarch by the number of times the oligarch is removed from the king, when he should have added them. In fact, the tyrant is only five times removed from the king, and so lives only 125 times less pleasantly!

SOCRATES: And yet it is a number that is both true and appropriate to human lives—if indeed days, nights, months, and years are appropriate to them.

GLAUCON: And of course they are appropriate.

SOCRATES: If the victory of the good and just person over the bad and unjust one in terms of pleasure is as great as that, won’t his victory in terms of its grace, beauty, and virtue be extraordinarily greater?

GLAUCON: Extraordinarily greater, indeed, by Zeus!

SOCRATES: All right, then. Since we have reached this point in the argu- (b) ment, let’s return to the first things we mentioned that led us here. I think someone said that doing injustice profits a completely unjust person who is believed to be just.Wasn’t that the claim?25 GLAUCON: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: Let’s discuss it with its proponent, then, since we have now agreed on the respective effects of doing unjust and doing just things.26 GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: By fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the one who said that will know what he was saying. (c) GLAUCON: What sort of image?

SOCRATES: One of those creatures that ancient legends say used to exist.

The Chimera, Scylla, Cerberus, and the numerous other cases where many different kinds are said to have grown together into one.

GLAUCON: Yes, they do describe such things.

SOCRATES: Well, then, fashion a single species of complex, many-headed beast, with a ring of tame and savage animal heads that it can grow and change at will.

GLAUCON: That’s a task for a clever fashioner of images!27 Still, since lan- (d) guage is easier to fashion than wax and the like, consider the fashioning done.

SOCRATES: Now, fashion another single species—of lion—and a single one of human being. But make the first much the largest and the second, second in size.

GLAUCON: That’s easier—the fashioning is done.

SOCRATES: Now, join the three in one, so that that they somehow grow together naturally.

[25]: See 348b9–10, 360c8–361d3, 392c2–4.

[26]: See 358b4–7, 367e1–5.

[27]: See 596b12–e4.

GLAUCON: They are joined.

SOCRATES: Then fashion around the outside the image of one of them, that of the human being, so that to anyone who cannot see what is inside, but sees only the outer shell, it will look like a single creature, a human (e) being.

GLAUCON: The surrounding shell has been fashioned.

SOCRATES: When someone claims, then, that it profits this human being to do injustice, but that doing what is just brings no advantage, let’s tell him that he is saying nothing other than that it profits him to feed well and strengthen the multifarious beast, as well as the lion and everything that pertains to the lion; to starve and weaken the human being, so that he is (589a) dragged along wherever either of the other two leads; and not to accustom the two to one another or make them friends, but leave them to bite and fight and devour one another.

GLAUCON: Yes, that’s exactly what someone who praises doing injustice is saying.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, wouldn’t someone who claims that what is just is profitable be saying we should do and say what will give the inner (b) human being the greatest mastery over the human being, to get him to take care of the many-headed beast like a farmer, feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing; to make the lion’s nature his ally; and to care for all in common, bringing them up in such a way that they will be friends with each other and with himself?

GLAUCON: Yes, that’s exactly what someone who praises justice is saying.

SOCRATES: From every point of view, then, the one who praises what is just speaks truly while the one who praises what is unjust speaks falsely. For (c) whether we consider pleasure or good reputation or advantage, the one who praises the just tells the truth while the one who condemns it has nothing sound to say and condemns with no knowledge of what he is condemning.

GLAUCON: None at all, in my opinion.

SOCRATES: Then let’s persuade him gently—after all, he is not getting it wrong intentionally—by questioning him as follows: “Bless you, but shouldn’t we claim that this is also the basis of the conventional views about what is fine and what is shameful: what is fine is what subordinates the beastlike elements in our nature to the human one—or better, perhaps, to (d) the divine, whereas what is shameful is what enslaves the tame element to the savage“? Will he agree, or what?

GLAUCON: He will if he takes my advice.

SOCRATES: Is there anyone, then, in light of this argument, who profits by acquiring gold unjustly, if the result is something like this: in taking the

gold, he simultaneously enslaves the best element in himself to the most (e) wicked? If he got the gold by enslaving his son or daughter to savage and evil men, it would not profit him, no matter how much he got for doing it.

So, if he ruthlessly enslaves the most divine element in himself to the most godless and polluted, how could he fail to be wretched, when he accepts golden gifts in return for a far more terrible destruction than that of Eri- phyle, who took the necklace in return for her husband’s soul?28 (590a) GLAUCON: A much more terrible one. I will answer for him.

SOCRATES: And don’t you think intemperance has long been condemned for reasons of this sort; that it is because of vices like it that that terrible creature, the large and multiform beast, is given more freedom than it should be?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And aren’t stubbornness and peevishness condemned because they inharmoniously increase and stretch the lionlike and snakelike29 (b) element?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And aren’t luxury and softness condemned for slackening and loosening this same part, because that produces cowardice in it?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And aren’t flattery and illiberality condemned because they subject this same spirited element to the moblike beast, allow it to be show- ered with abuse for the sake of money and the latter’s insatiability, and habituate it from youth to be an ape instead of a lion? (c) GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Why do you think someone is reproached for menial work or handicraft? Or shall we say that it is for no other reason than because the best element is naturally weak in him, so that it cannot rule the beasts within him, but can only serve them and learn what flatters them?

GLAUCON: Apparently.

[28]: Eriphyle was bribed by Polynices to persuade her husband, Amphiaraus, to take part in an attack on Thebes. He was killed, and she was murdered by her son in revenge. See Odyssey 11.326–7.

[29]: The snakelike element hasn’t been previously mentioned, although it may be included in “all that pertains to” the lion (588e6). It symbolizes some of the meaner components of the spirited part, such as peevishness, which it would be unnatural to attribute to the noble lion. Snakes were thought to guard shrines and other sacred places. Including a snakelike element in the part of the soul dominant in guardians is, therefore, somewhat natural.

SOCRATES: In order to ensure, then, that someone like that is also ruled by something similar to what rules the best person, we say that he should be the slave of that best person who has the divine ruler within himself. It is (d) not to harm the slave that we say he should be ruled, as Thrasymachus sup- posed was true of all subjects, but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by a divine and wise ruler—preferably one that is his own and that he has inside himself; otherwise one imposed on him from outside, so that we may all be as alike and as friendly as possible, because we are all captained by the same thing.

GLAUCON: Yes, that’s right. (e) SOCRATES: This is clearly the aim of the law as well, which is the ally of everyone in the city. It is also our aim in ruling our children. We do not allow them to be free until we establish a constitution in them as in a city.

That is to say, we take care of their best part with the similar one in our- (591a) selves and equip them with a guardian and ruler similar to our own to take our place. Only then do we set them free.

GLAUCON: Yes, that’s clearly so.

SOCRATES: How, then, will we claim, Glaucon, and on the basis of what argument, that it profits someone to do injustice, or what is intemperate, or some shameful thing that will make him worse, even if it brings more money or power of some other sort?

GLAUCON: There’s no way we can.

SOCRATES: Or how can we claim that it profits him to be undetected in his injustice and not pay the penalty? I mean, doesn’t the one who remains (b) undetected become even worse, while in the one who is discovered and punished, the bestial element is calmed and tamed and the gentle one freed? Doesn’t his entire soul, when it returns to its best nature and acquires temperance and justice along with wisdom, achieve a condition that is as more honorable than that of a body when it acquires strength and beauty along with health, as a soul is more honorable than a body?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Won’t anyone with any sense, then, give everything he has to (c) achieve it as long as he lives? First, won’t he honor the studies that produce it and not honor the others?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Second, as regards the condition and nurture of his body, not only will he not give himself over to bestial and irrational pleasure, and live turned in that direction; but he won’t make health his aim nor give prece- dence to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful, unless he is also going to become temperate as a result of them. On the contrary, it is

(d) clear that he will always be tuning the harmony of his body for the sake of the concord of his soul.

GLAUCON: He certainly will, if indeed he is going to be truly musical.

SOCRATES: Won’t he also keep order and concord in his acquisition of money? He won’t be dazzled, will he, by what the masses regard as blessed happiness, and—by increasing the size of his wealth without limit—acquire an unlimited number of evils?

GLAUCON: Not in my view.

SOCRATES: On the contrary, he will keep his eye fixed on the constitution (e) within him and guard against disturbing anything there either with too much money or with too little. Captaining himself in that way, he will increase and spend his wealth, as far as possible by reference to it.

GLAUCON: That’s exactly what he will do.

SOCRATES: Where honors are concerned, too, he will keep his eye on the (592a) same thing. He will willingly share in and taste those he believes will make him better. But those that might overthrow the established condition of his soul, he will avoid, both in private and in public.

GLAUCON: So, he won’t be willing to take part in politics, then, if that is what he cares about.

SOCRATES: Yes, by the dog,30 in his own city, he certainly will. But he may not be willing to do so in his fatherland, unless some divine good luck chances to be his.

GLAUCON: I understand.You mean in the city we have just been founding and describing; the one that exists in words, since I do not think it exists (b) anywhere on earth.

SOCRATES: But there may perhaps be a model of it in the heavens for any- one who wishes to look at it and to found himself on the basis of what he sees. It makes no difference at all whether it exists anywhere or ever will.

You see, he would take part in the politics of it alone, and of no other.

GLAUCON: That’s probably right.

[30]: See 399e5 note.