Glossary of Terms

being (ousia) Abstract noun derived from einai (to be).The being of (e.g.,) justice is what justice really is. captain (kubernêtês) A combination of our ship’s captain, helmsman, and navigator. (a) city (polis) A canonical Greek polis is a unique political organization. Unlike modern city, it enjoyed the political sovereignty characteristic of a modern state: it could possess its own army and navy, enter into alliances, make war and peace, and so on. Unlike a typical modern state, however, it was culturally and religiously homogenous and quite small in scale.The territory of a typical polis included a sin- gle (usually) walled town (astu), with a citadel (akropolis) and a marketplace (agora), which, as the political and administrative center, is itself often referred to as a polis.

But a polis also included the surrounding agricultural land, and the citizens lived both there and in the town proper. cloak (himation) The draped mantle worn by Greek men—and eventually by women as well—throughout the eastern Mediterranean. It was a rectangle of cloth (approximately 9 × 6 feet), which was draped so as to be supported by the left arm, leaving the right one free. Originally worn without a tunic (a sleeveless garment made of two pieces of cloth joined at the sides and shoulders), it was usually worn with one by the fourth century. Men usually wore a triangular loincloth under- neath it. craft (technê) “Technê” has the sort of connotation for Socrates and Plato that “sci- ence” has for us.Thus fifth-century doctors tried to show that medicine is a technê. daimon, daimonic (to daimonion) Daimons are either gods or children of gods and mortals (Apology 27d–e). They serve as intermediaries between gods and human beings (Symposium 202e). Socrates’ famous daimonion is the voice or sign of (a) daimon, and so of either a god (Apollo, in this case) or his offspring (Apology 26b– 28a, 31c–d). disputation (antilogikê) Literally, antilogic.Also called eristic. dithyramb Choral song to the god Dionysus. do better (pleonektein) An important notion in the Republic. Connected to pleon- exia—wanting to get and have more and more. Pleonexia is the chief cause of injus- tice (359c), since it leads one to try to get what belongs to other people, what isn’t one’s own. Contrasted with doing or having one’s own, which is, or is the cause of, jus- tice (434a, 441e). eristic Argument that aims at scoring points against an opponent, rather than at discovering the truth (see 537e1–539c3). Contrasted with dialectic, which does aim at the truth (537c9–d8, 539d3–540c2).Also called disputation.

excellence See virtue. flute (aulos) Unlike the flute, the aulos is a reed instrument, like an oboe.The aulos was thought to be especially good at conveying emotion. illusionistic painting (skiagraphos) Literally, shadow-painting. Painting in black and white in which shading creates an illusion of volume, as in the cave analogy. irony (eirôneia) Unlike irony as we understand it, eirôneia is correctly attributed only to someone who intends to deceive. judge (dikastês) Literally, a member of a jury. However, Athenian juries combined the functions of deciding guilt or innocence and imposing a penalty that we divide between judge and jury. justice (dikaiosunê) The topic of the Republic. Often broader in scope than our notion of justice and more nearly equivalent to ethical rightness in general. Its opposite, adikia, then has the sense of general wrongdoing. masses, the (hoi polloi) Literally, the many. Ordinary, relatively poor people, who typically made up the majority of a city’s inhabitants. Often contrasted in Greek political thought with “the few,” who were typically rich and often aristocratic. musical training (mousikê) Includes poetry and stories, as well as music proper.

Effects characterized at 401d5–402d9, 410b10–412b1, 522a3–b1. pancration A mixture of boxing and wrestling, combined with kicking and stran- gling. Biting and gouging were forbidden, but nearly everything else, including breaking and dislocating limbs, was permitted. physical training (gymnastikê) Includes dance and training in warfare, as well as what we call physical training. Effects characterized at 401d5–402d9, 410b10– 412b1, 522a3–b1. relish (opson) Anything eaten with the staples, such as the barley and wheat breads. rhapsode Someone who memorized epic poems and gave dramatic recitations of them. sophists Itinerant teachers who charged sometimes substantial fees for popular lectures and specialized instruction in a wide variety of fields, including natural sci- ence, rhetoric, grammar, ethics, and politics.They did not constitute a single school or movement and were neither doctrinally nor organizationally united. sycophants Athens had nothing corresponding to our public prosecutors. Private citizens prosecuted cases themselves. By the middle of the fifth century, some Athe- nians began to make a profession of bringing nuisance suits against others, which they dropped in exchange for a bribe.These people were called sycophants.A vivid sense of their power and importance is conveyed in L. B. Carter,The Quiet Athenian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). temperance (sôphrosunê) Also self-mastery, self-discipline, good sense, reasonable- ness, moderation, and (in some contexts) chastity. Someone who keeps his head under pressure or temptation possesses sôphrosunê. thing that is (to on) Because of the ambiguity of the verb einai (“to be”), a thing that is could be: (1) a thing that exists (existential “is”); (2) a thing that is, for example, beautiful (predicative “is”); (3) a thing that is true or something that is (veridical “is”).

virtue (arête) If something is a knife or a man, its virtue, as knife or man, is that state or property of it that makes it good (Charmides 161a8–9; Euthyphro 6d9–e1; Gorgias 506d2–4; Protagoras 332b4–6; Republic 353d9–354a2).The aretê of a knife might include having a sharp blade; the aretê of a man might include being intelli- gent, well born, just, or courageous. Aretê is thus broader than our notion of moral virtue, which tends to be applied only to human beings, and restricted to good sex- ual behavior or helpfulness to others. Aretê, by contrast, applies to things (such as knives) that are not moral agents, and to aspects of moral agents (such as intelli- gence or family status) that have nothing to do with sex or with behavior toward others. what it is (ho estin) If we ask what justice is, the correct answer will specify (the) what it is.What we might mean in speaking of the essence of justice.